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ABSTRACT
IDEOLOGICAL ENDZONES: NFL FILMS AND THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE
TRADITION IN AMERICAN POLITICS
MAY 2010
NICHOLAS R. ARCHER, B.A., KEENE STATE COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Dean E. Robinson

This study examines the role of propaganda and popular culture in constituting the
American political tradition through the study of NFL films by employing a decidedly
overlooked theoretical conception of the American political tradition—the
countersubversive tradition thesis. Originally put forth by Michael Rogin, the
countersubversive tradition is defined as “the creation of monsters as a continuing feature
of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and dehumanization of political
foes.” It is my belief that in looking at what constitutes the individual characteristics of
the countersubversive tradition in a text like a sports film it is easier to see how it fits into
similar theories offered by political scientists and others about the intersections of pop
culture, sport, propaganda, and political tradition.
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INTRODUCTION
MASS TEXTS, THE NFL, AND THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE TRADITION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS
“The NFL is America’s passion; pure and simple…the grip of an NFL team on its fans
and community is special. It brings families and communities together in a unique way.”
- “This is the NFL 2008-09”1
“The public must be reduced to passivity in the political realm, but for submissiveness to
become a reliable trait, it must be entrenched in the realm of belief as well.”
- Noam Chomsky2

After stunning the heavily-favored St. Louis Rams in Super Bowl XXXVI in
2002 (the first Super Bowl held after 9/11), New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft
said “We are all Patriots, and tonight the Patriots are world champions.” Commentary on
the NFL Films-produced documentary of the victory said “like their country, they were
brothers in arms—proud to be called Patriots.”3 Both Kraft’s comments and the NFL’s
own commentary equated the victory of a sports franchise with a collective national
identity at a particularly nationalistic moment in American history. The victory of a
sports brotherhood became symbolic of an armed national brotherhood, defying odds
after a psychologically damaging national tragedy and marching to war against an enemy
that had penetrated American shores.
It would perhaps be easy to see the not-so-latent evocations of patriotism and
national armed unity as entertainment merely imitating politics—a calculating owner and
1

“This is the NFL 2008-2009” National Football League (2008).

2

Noam Chomsky, “Containing the Threat of Democracy,” (paper presented at the Glasgow Conference on
Self-Determination and Power: Life Task, Political Task, January 1990).
3

Patriots: Superbowl XXXVI Champions, directed by Dave Petreilius (New York, NY: NFL Films/USA
Home Entertainment, 2002).

1

league merely responding to a national event in a way that would help their product grow
by capitalizing on existing political sentiment. In this study, I turn the causality arrow in
the other direction. Rather than seeing mass entertainment as ancillary to questions of
political belief, I argue that both today and historically, mass entertainment, in this
particular case professional football filmography, is a central yet overlooked constitutive
element which produces and defines the boundaries of permissible political discourse and
subsequently a significant part of the political tradition in America—a tradition whose
meaning has been disputed rigorously in American politics.
The Question of the American Political Tradition in Scholarship
Commenting on the persisting power of Louis Hartz’ The Liberal Tradition in
America nearly 50 years after it was published, James Morone noted that contemporary
Political Science generally and American political tradition scholarship specifically
seems to be stuck in a “Hartzian amber” of liberalism which argues the American
political tradition in terms of a few narrow concepts: commitment to equality, rights,
limited government and economic markets, while simultaneously ignoring the importance
of popular culture in the shaping of American political belief.4 The hue of the Hartzian
amber is evident in Seymour Martin Lipset’s description of America as the “most
religious, optimistic, patriotic, rights-oriented, and individualistic” nation in the world.5
Of course, scholars of the liberal tradition were and are not necessarily fetishists of
liberalism as such—Lipset argues that the valuation of liberal individualism is directly

4

James Morone, “Storybook Truths about America,” Studies in American Political Development 19, Fall
2005: 225.
5

Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton,
1995), 26.

2

responsible for everything from high crime rates to teen pregnancy6—and as Morone has
pointed out, Hartz, wrote his book as a polemic against what he saw as an “irrational
obsession with market capitalism that, at times, subverted private rights and personal
liberty.”7 Still, whatever problems they may see with unbridled liberalism, liberal
tradition scholars are quick to point out the futility of trying to suggest alternatives to it,
in part arguing that to do so is antithetical to a democratic culture since individuals need
to keep their ideological engagements to make sense of social existence even as the world
around them changes.8
Nonetheless, challenges to the liberal tradition thesis have sprung up periodically.
Of these, perhaps the most noteworthy has been Rogers Smith’s multiple traditions thesis.
In his criticism of American political tradition scholarship, Smith notes that even scholars
critical of the liberal tradition, be they advocates of “synthetic republicanism” such as
James Pocock and Bernard Bailyn or “Protestantism” such as John Diggins all concede
that their own conceptions of the political tradition are welded to liberalism in some
shape or form. Hence, as Smith notes, while these debates represent interesting work
within political tradition scholarship, they are not challenging the idea that American
political culture is fundamentally or most enduringly liberal.9
Smith’s own contribution, the multiple traditions thesis, argues that attachments to
liberalism and republicanism must also be seen in light of a third tradition of

6

Ibid.

7

Morone, 220.

8

Lipset, 276.

9

Rogers Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: Multiple Traditions in America,” The American
Political Science Review 87, no.3 (Fall 2003): 549.

3

ascriptivism—the attachment of characteristics to certain groups largely on the basis of
race, which promotes decidedly illiberal ideologies that have defined the political status
of minorities and women through most of American history. In his work Smith primarily
focuses on the intellectual codification of ascriptive ideology and its dissemination
through law. Using post-Reconstruction history from 1870 to 1920 as his period of study,
Smith argues that intellectual and political elites “worked out the most elaborate theories
of racial and gender hierarchy in the U.S., as evidenced by laws governing everything
from immigration, deportation, voting rights, electoral institutions, judicial procedures,
and economic rights.10 Exemplary of this is his discussion of the anthropological work of
Daniel G. Brinton and its impact on Chinese exclusion policy. As Smith notes, Brinton’s
contention that each race had a “peculiar mental temperament which has become
hereditary,” leaving them “constitutionally recreant to codes of civilization,” became part
and parcel of the justification for anti-immigration acts.11 And he notes that ascriptive
tensions—be they racial, nativist, or religious—are still powerful today as evidenced by
the existence of organizations like the Christian Coalition, patterns of de facto racial
segregation and right-wing populist electoral campaigns like those run by David Duke
and Pat Buchanan.12
To Smith, liberalism is a constitutive, though not always dominant, part of the
larger political tradition, and in all eras of American political development Americans
have combined liberal rhetoric with frequently inegalitarian practice.13 Smith’s
10

Ibid. 559.

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid. 563.

13

Ibid. 559.
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examination is important in acknowledging a complexity of ideas in the political tradition
as well as acknowledging that aspirants to power must make a population see itself “as a
people” by creating “myths of civic identity” that foster the “requisite sense of people
hood.”14 Similarly, writing about slavery and ideology, Barbra Jeanne Fields notes that
while ideology is not the same as propaganda, “the most successful propagandist is one
who thoroughly understands the ideology of those to be propagandized.” In the context of
slavery and the Civil War, it would make little sense for white southern planters to try to
rally poor white yeoman to support the war under the banner of, “We must never let them
take our slaves” but rather to state, “We will never be slaves.” 15 The relationship between
ideology and propaganda, as Fields sees it, is one where propaganda reinforces the
ideology that comes out of people’s everyday existence. Propaganda cannot create
ideology. It cannot “hand [ideology] down like an old garment,”16 but as a mechanism
built on repetition and mass appeal, it can reinforce dominant strands of thought in
everyday life, providing reassurance that the ideology practiced is in fact correct and
necessary. It is this propaganda function of popular culture in relationship to the
reinforcement of belief that is missing in American political tradition scholarship and is
addressed in this study.
In pursuing the role of propaganda and popular culture in constituting the
American political tradition, I employ an overlooked theoretical conception of the
American political tradition—the countersubversive tradition thesis. Originally put forth

14

Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Views of Citizenship in the Liberal State (Yale University Press,
1997), 6.
15

Barbra Jeanne Fields, “Slavery, Race and Ideology,” in New Left Review (181, 1990) 111.

16

Ibid. 113.
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by Michael Rogin in 1987 in his work Ronald Reagan: the Movie and other Episodes in
Political Demonology, the countersubversive tradition is defined as “the creation of
monsters as a continuing feature of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and
dehumanization of political foes.”17 This type of “political demonology” has both a
recurring form and content. The practitioner of demonology, through mass propaganda,
creates a binary division of the world, attributing magical and pervasive power to a
“conspiratorial center of evil.” Fearing alien penetration, the countersubversive interprets
grassroots or popular initiatives as signs of alien invasion and subsequently sees
individuals and select groups as members of this conspiratorial alien evil, now a single
political body directed by a head. The creation of these monsters is essential for the
countersubversive in order to give a shape to his anxieties and allow him to indulge in his
own dangerous desires. In short, demonization allows the countersubversive, in the name
of battling subversion, to imitate his enemy.18 Consequently, countersubversive politics
(and the popular texts created by political actors and mass media producers who practice
them) tends to have a very distinct set of characteristics: a war on local and partial
loyalties, attachment to secrecy, valuation of hierarchical order, invasiveness and fear of
boundary invasion, fascination with violence, and a desire to subordinate political variety
to a dominant authority. Thus practices attributed to subversive groups actually are
depictions of countersubversive aspirations—from a president who accuses Communists
of overthrowing free governments so he may do so himself to blaming budget deficits on

17

Michael Rogin, Ronald Reagan: the Movie and other Episodes in Political Demonology, (University of
California Press, 1987), xiii.
18

Ibid.

6

profligate spending and an invasive State while acting as if the administrative apparatus
of that State had no part in these decisions.19
The ideological substance of the countersubversive tradition—with its emphasis
on the creation of monsters (from the Indian cannibal to the bomb-throwing anarchist20)
bares a remarkable resemblance to the ascriptive tradition in the multiple traditions thesis
put forward by Smith six years later. Rogin himself argues that both republicanism and
Puritanism have played important, though comparatively smaller, roles in constituting the
American regime than the countersubversive tradition.21 The two theses—while similar
in substantive critique of liberal traditionalists—differ as to where liberal values fit within
the development of American political thought. Smith sees a distinct liberal current
running concurrently with other independent traditions. Additionally, Smith heralds what
he sees as times when the liberal tradition has been dominant such as in the post-World
War II Civil Rights and feminist struggles.22 The countersubversive tradition, by contrast,
accepts the hegemony of liberalism as the dominant ideology in shaping the American
regime but sees it as a value system which is constituted by a tenuous welding of two
strands of political values—individualism and community. The demon becomes the
proxy for this tension—a manifestation of difference that unites people against it.23 Thus,
the countersubversive tradition, in slight juxtaposition to Smith’s multiple traditions

19

Ibid. 284-285.

20

Ibid. xiii.

21

Ibid. 283.

22

Smith, “Multiple Traditions,” 559.

23

Rogin, 280-281.
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thesis, is willing to accept the centrality of liberalism to American politics but explores,
through a semiotic lens, what exactly liberalism looks like and what its actual practice
entails in terms of making liberal States function. Seen this way, ascriptivism or
demonology is not separate from liberalism but is in fact a necessary constitutive part of
it. The imperialistic and nationalistic necessities that come from an ideology which
simultaneously emphasizes material acquisition as the highest moral value requires
justification for the acts that allow the perpetuation of liberal states, such as wars,
expansion of domestic repression apparatuses, etc., acts that become easier to justify
when fear of difference is reinforced in popular culture.
The second difference between the theses regards the point of study and breadth
in the two conceptions. Smith’s study, which is in many ways the master work on
American political culture, examines a dynamic and voluminous amount of intellectual
opinion and law and its consequences to legislation and social policy in a myriad of ways.
Analysts of the countersubversive tradition take a narrower view, studying the use of
symbols embedded in cultural documents, particularly mass entertainment, to suggest
how countersubversive belief penetrates the mass psyche and creates political quiescence
by transposing its values onto lived experience. The countersubversive thesis also
suggests, though does not assert definitively, that mass texts are able to reach individuals
in different and more intimate ways than elite texts such as legal opinions or pieces of
legislation because they have the ability to some degree mask the social hierarchies from
which they appear through a perception of independence and sheer ubiquity.24

24

It should be noted that when I refer to “elite” versus “mass” texts I am referring to audiences rather than
the constructors of a text. In the latter case, all the examples in this study could be considered “elitist” in
that they are composed by individuals with political and economic clout—namely the business community
and conservative politicians— in the American power structure. However, the audiences are decidedly

8

As Michel de Certeau pointed out, textual reading becomes “overprinted by a
relationship of forces (between teachers and pupils or producers and consumers), whose
instrument it becomes.” The text can become a cultural weapon, the “pretext for a law
that legitimizes as ‘literal’ the interpretation given by socially authorized professionals
and intellectuals.”25 Insofar as hierarchical positions are visible in formal institutions
(churches, governments, etc.), the acceptance of the literal (or desired) interpretation of
texts hinges on the legitimacy of these formal institutions in mass society. DeCerteau
argues that when an institution loses its legitimacy, the text becomes more subject to the
individual reader’s silent, “poetic activity” in their private space.26 In a liberal society
where antipathy to formal government institutions and valuation of the private is part of
the ideological base of organization, stakeholders in the political economy must find
ways to try to ensure literal meanings get through to the multitude of private psyches
while masking their connections to formal hierarchical structures. DeCerteau suggests
this is done by creating ubiquitous private mechanisms like mass media who, rather than
attempting to speak through institutional authority, attempt to speak “in the name of
reality” itself.
Captured by the radio (the voice is the law) as soon as he awakens, the listener
walks all day long through the forest of narratives from journalism, advertising,
and television, narratives that still find time as he is getting ready for bed, to slip a
few final messages under the portals of sleep. Even more than the God told about
by the theologians of earlier days, these stories have a providential and
predestining function: they organize in advance our work, our celebrations, and
different in terms of whom the text is geared toward—with legal doctrine and scholarship fixated on people
in government and knowledge production vs. ordinary citizens and, in the specific case study here, average
NFL fans.
25

Michel deCerteau, The Practice of Everyday Life, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984),
171.
26

Ibid. 172

9

even our dreams. Social life multiplies the gestures and modes of behavior
imprinted by narrative models; it ceasely reproduces and accumulates ‘copies’ of
our stories.27

Mass texts are thus perceived as an effective vehicle for the reinforcement of
countersubversive values through their perceived utility as an independent reference for
an individuals’ everyday reality. Their simultaneous inundation of the audience with
repetitive symbols function to assure individuals reproduce the social hierarchies and
“literal” interpretations of society.28 The more the stories and symbols are reproduced, the
more their frame of reality becomes the only genuine alternative reference point by which
people can understand their social and political worlds. The suggestion of a connection
between the power of symbols to shape reality and consequently political behavior was
perhaps best enunciated by Murray Edelman, who noted that American politics is
permeated with “condensation symbols.” The power of these symbols lies in their ability
to “condense into one symbolic event, sign, or patriotic act concepts of pride, anxieties,
remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness” either
exclusively or concurrently. By externalizing inner unresolved problems of everyday life,
these symbols can give emotion to political acts that are far removed from an individuals’
everyday experience and which they have no control over by calling for conformity to
promote social harmony. In essence, they can “create a dramatic symbolic life among

27

Ibid. 172-173.

28

DeCerteau refers to this as the power of citation, which he calls the “ultimate weapon for making people
believe… By replacing doctrines that have become unbelievable, citation allows the technocratic
mechanisms to make themselves believable in the name of others.” See Practice of Everyday Life, 189.
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abstractions” which becomes “a substitute gratification for the pleasure of remolding the
concrete environment.”29
Countersubversive values are enveloped in a sophisticated form of mass
propaganda predicated on condensation symbols. They arouse personal anxiety for
repressive political purposes. Images of the black rapist or the Indian cannibal play upon
sexual desire and fear as threats to bodily integrity. The propagandist employing the
countersubversive tradition expropriates personal experience, speaking for it and not to it
and in doing so creating what Rogin calls a “false personal.”30 The precise vehicle of
dissemination of countersubversive symbols is mass media, with newspapers being the
first vehicle to textually construct images of the childlike Indian31 or imagine vast
conspiracies of the Illuminati to destroy newly-won independence.32 Yet, according to
Rogin, it was not until the birth of film as mass entertainment in the early 20th Century
that countersubversives found their most effective means for dissemination of symbols.
Rogin points to D.W. Griffith’s early epic commercial film Birth of a Nation as
the turning point in the power of countersubversive dissemination. Griffith’s Birth joined
aesthetic invention to mass appeal33 in a way that cut across class, ethnic, and sectional
lines in ways Progressive cultural reformers could only earlier dream of.34 Moreover, the
fact that Griffith (a friend of President Woodrow Wilson) presented the movie as
29

Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (second edition), (Chicago: University of Illinois Press,
1985), 7-9.
30

Rogin, 287.

31

Ibid. 144.

32

Ibid. 56.

33

Ibid. 190.

34

Ibid. 197.
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historical fact—despite the fact it was based on the racist novel The Clansmen—allowed
mass entertainment to function as a narrative of historical reality and in doing so,
redefined history in a way conducive to countersubversive values and State stakeholder
interests. As with other condensation symbols, movie images—seen from afar—allowed
audiences to be voyeurs rather than participants. It broke down defenses and opened
roads to the unconscious. The size of the image, its reproducibility, the close-up and filmcut, the magical transformations on screen and the film’s documentary pretense dissolved
the boundaries that separated audiences in darkened theaters from the screen, pulling
viewers to an originary condition of illusory unity with an ordinary sense of being. It did
not render reality. It was reality.35
As it concerns the question of American political tradition, analysts of Rogin’s
thesis argue the countersubversive value system is exceptional in its ability to take
cultural documents, particularly visual ones such as film and now television, and link the
personal to the political and the illusory to the real. The ability of the image to reach into
cognitive and emotional sources of being means it has tremendous power. Political
spectacle and the surveillance state that has grown alongside the proliferation of film and
television starting during the Cold War period and continuing through to the Bush and
Obama administrations, uses the power of image in service of deception, rigid and
deceptive forms of mobilization, and terror. This process makes political events “a
personalized affair.” Tyrants become humanly likeable as the social realities of their
tyranny are ignored.36
35

Ibid. 228-229.

36

Michael Parenti, Make Believe Media: The Politics of Entertainment, (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1992), 68.

12

This study seeks to examine the countersubversive tradition by examining a more
contemporary manifestation than the ones provided by Rogin of Progressive Era and
Cold War cinema. Whereas Rogin concentrated on the countersubversive potential of the
visual through made-for-cinema film, I argue that the film visual through programming
made for private video and television consumption has given the countersubversive
practitioner even more power to disseminate propaganda—if only for the simple reason
that television’s reach and capacity to captivate the individual is greater. After all, the act
of going to the cinema and taking in the theatrical experience, even in a darkened theatre,
is one that requires some entrance and interaction with a public space. With television
(and home video), we receive the images in the privacy of our living rooms, making any
potential public response and discourse difficult.37
The analytic approach I take also differs from the one Rogin originally used.
Rogin takes a holistic (if not scattered) approach to examining the countersubversive
tradition in earlier American epochs and filmography—loosely and often implicitly tying
the previously aforementioned characteristics of countersubversion into a larger Freudian
narrative American political culture. In my study, I analyze the characteristics of
countersubversion elementally, referring to a variety of scholars to strengthen my
arguments. It is my belief that in looking at what constitutes the individual characteristics
of the countersubversive tradition in a text it is easier to see how they fit into similar
theories offered by political scientists and others about the intersections of pop culture,
propaganda, and political tradition. Lastly, in contrast to Rogin who views the
countersubversive tradition as a master narrative, I argue that countersubversion is often
37

Todd Gitlin, “Television’s Screens: Hegemony in Transition,” in American Media and Mass Culture:
Left Perspectives, ed. Donald Lazere, (University of California Press, 1987), 247.
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augmented and, perhaps more importantly, contested in other political settings that can
also been seen in the workings of the case study of the NFL.
Understanding the Power of Pro Football
Sport in Scholarly Perspective
Just as political science has generally overlooked to a large extent the power of
popular culture in reinforcing ideological value systems, so too has much of the scholarly
work on Sport and Society veered away from examining how sport operates as a cohesive
propaganda tool in the American political tradition. Rooted in Cultural Studies and
Sociology, most contemporary scholarship on sports in the United States focuses
primarily on identity issues related to sport (e.g. the construction of racial archetypes) and
society without offering a distinct political thesis as to why certain issues and values are
salient in sport. For example, in 2007, the Journal of Sport and Social Issues published a
special issue on “White Power and Sport in America” which examined how sport
discourse shapes White supremacist thinking. Of particular note in the issue was Doug
Hartmann’s analysis of Rush Limbaugh’s firing from ESPN’s NFL pregame show after
making critical comments regarding Philadelphia Eagles’ African American quarterback
Donovan McNabb.
Hartmann’s analysis of the sports establishment media’s reaction to the Limbaugh
affair, in which the commentator argued that McNabb was receiving special treatment
from the media due to his race, found that most of the discourse and dismissal of
Limbaugh was based less on his conception of “white normative vision and privilege” but
more so on his transgression of the current dominant perception of sporting as a “Mecca

14

of racial purity and justice.”38 The net result of the study according to the author is that
“the ideologies and discourses of the sports world cause its adherents to misunderstand
the problems of race in the United States” and how structural White dominance
contributes to them.39
Hartmann’s work is provocative in that it suggests there is a link between the
reassurances of ideological systems and sports, yet like work typical of Sport and Society
scholarship, it finds both the question and the answer in sport itself rather than seeing it
as an extension of a broader system of propaganda and political economy that attempts to
reinforce certain base values in mass society. This was not always the case. Writing in
1979, John Hargreaves argued that sport—State relations must be looked at through the
lens of “class accommodation.” Just as labor pursued economism to land policy gains
while conceding influence to dominant groups, so did sport create pathways to new
material benefits for workers as fans and players while throwing the ideological
substance of sport to beliefs in capitalism and State prerogatives.40 Today, sport is seen a
near-exclusive place where these values are promulgated, reinforced, and where they may
ultimately be challenged (if they are). Exemplary of this is argument is the work of
George H. Sage in Power and Ideology in American Sport: a Critical Perspective. Sage
argues that sport is the epicenter for hegemony in American culture, while
simultaneously arguing that by constructing a “progressive” sport system, one can

38

Doug Hartmann “Rush Limbaugh, Donovan McNabb, and A Little Social Concern ,” Journal of Sport
and Social Issues 31, no.1, 2007: 43-54.
39

Ibid.

40

John Hargreaves, “Sport and Hegemony: Some Theoretical Problems,” in Sport, Culture, and the
Modern State, Hart Cantelon and Richard Gruneau, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 133.
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transform the inequalities of American life and advance “the democratic imperative”
which he sees at the heart of American society.41
Hartmann, perhaps channeling Hargreaves, keenly acknowledges the limits of this
type of analysis, arguing that there must be an examination of the messages in sport in a
larger context of other social organizational structures, including a capitalist society and
by consequence a sporting world driven by market obsession and political dynamics.42
Fortunately, scholars in other disciplines are starting to engage with this type of analysis.
In early 2010 political scientist and legal scholar Robert Elias published The Empire
Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S. Foreign Policy and Promoted the American Way
Abroad. In the book Elias argues that since the Revolutionary War, baseball—major
league baseball (MLB) in particular—has “tried to associate itself with values of the
American Dream. It has “also sought to equate itself with American masculinity and
patriotism and with U.S. military endeavors in particular.”43 Using a combination of
political and historical analysis, Elias traces this association between American
imperialism and baseball through most of America’s major conflicts up until the Iraq War
of 2004. Talking about the early American imperium in Latin America following the
Spanish-American War, Elias notes how baseball players and business owners like Albert
Spalding were eager to use the sport as another means of civilizing the conquered
territories of places like Puerto Rico and Cuba.

41

George H. Sage, Power and Ideology in American Sport: A Critical Perspective (Champaign, IL: Human
Kinetics, 1998) 291.
42

Ibid., 57.

43

Robert Elias, The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S. Foreign Policy and Promoted the
American Way Abroad, (New York: the New Press, 2010) 1.
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To make baseball not just originally American but also currently American,
Albert Spalding defined it as a part of the U.S. imperialist pageant, proclaiming
that “wherever a ship floating the Stars and Stripes finds anchorage day to day,
somewhere on a nearby shore the American National Game is in progress.” The
expansion of America was confirmed by the expansion of the game.44

What Elias’ work demonstrates is that many of the issues that will be examined in
this study—the synergy between sport and State prerogatives, fascination with violence
and militarism, and a fetishism of paternal governance are not unique to the NFL but
seem to be indicative of larger trends of countersubversion, sport, and the American
political tradition. Clearly, more work on this subject must be done so the extent of sportState synergy in terms of ideology and propaganda can be fully appreciated. Deeper and
multifaceted approaches, such as a content analysis of sports media coverage as well as
comparative studies of the role of sport in other countries would undoubtedly help in
creating a better understanding of countersubversive phenomena in sporting more
generally. It is my sincere hope that this brief study of NFL filmography gets the
scholastic ball rolling further on this subject. But before taking on questions of such
deeper analysis, it is necessary to situate the NFL more generally in American popular
culture.
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NFL Television as Economic and Cultural Powerhouse
Since its first nationally-televised game—the 1958 NFL Championship game
between the New York Giants and the Baltimore Colts, the NFL45 has grown into an
economic and cultural powerhouse that surpasses nearly any other televised sport and
most scripted prime-time television in terms of mass popularity. As sports journalist
Mark Yost noted in his book Tailgating, Sacks and Salary Caps: How the NFL Became
the Most Successful Sports League in History, the NFL commands far and away the most
revenue in terms of television deals and the most ratings in relation to all of the
professional sports and television programming in general. According to Yost’s
compilations, the NFL contracts renewed by ESPN, NBC, CBS, and DirectTV were for
$1.1 billion, $600 million, 712.5 million, $622.5 million and $700 million respectively.46
The reason for these huge contract has to do with the sheer ratings power (and thus
advertising dollars) NFL broadcasts command. Super Bowl XLIV, which featured the
upstart New Orleans Saints against League powerhouse Indianapolis, received 106.5
million viewers, one million more than the final episode of the acclaimed series
M*A*S*H*.47 An annual Harris Poll measuring the popularity of televised sports found
30 percent of viewers saying the NFL was their favorite sport in 2007—double that of the
alleged Great American Pastime of Major League Baseball. It was the 43rd year the NFL
45
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has held the number one spot in that poll.48 What is most remarkable about this popularity
is that it cuts across racial and gender lines—a finding that would seem counterintuitive
given what scholarship exists on the subject. A 2007 ESPN Sports poll showed 26
percent of Hispanics choosing pro football as their favorite spectator sport, 12 percentage
points higher than Major League Baseball. According to Nielson ratings results, the NFL
received a 12.8 share among African American viewers, with the NBA coming in a
distant second (7.1).49
But perhaps the most surprising finding of demographic research done on the
NFL is the popularity the sport enjoys with women. Results of the 2004 Harris sports poll
had women respondents rank the NFL first in popularity at 30 percent—nearly a 2-1
margin over second ranked Major League Baseball. Moreover, the NFL estimates that
approximately 375,000 women attend NFL games each weekend, and females constitute
about 50 percent of the NFL’s overall viewership. Nielson ratings showed that in 2007,
more women watched Super Bowl XLII (69.7 million) than watched the 2007 Academy
Awards (64.2 million). What makes these findings surprising is that they contradict
generally held assumptions among media analysts and scholars alike about the NFL as a
decidedly anti-female vehicle for the reaffirmation of masculinity and male dominance
over female empowerment.50 While there is undoubtedly some truth to the notion of the
NFL as a predominantly male-oriented product (the first demographic the NFL touts in
its promotional literature is its high performance in the 18-45 male viewing

48

“NFL Kickoff 2008”, The National Football League (2008), 12.

49

Ibid. 13

50

This is the central thesis of the oft-cited work by journalist Mariah Burton Nelson, The Stronger Women
Get, the More Men Love Football: Sexism and the American Culture of Sports, (Harcourt-Brace 1994).

19

demographic), the overall viewing patterns of female viewers seem to suggest that they
are more than willing spectators and enthusiasts of the sport. Moreover, this scholarship
seems to discount the very concerted efforts on the part of the League to boost female
interest in the sport. More than 1 million girls participate in the Pepsi sponsored NFL
Punt, Pass, and Kick annual competition. In addition, some 10,000 women attend the
League’s annual “NFL 101 Workshops for Women” which cover nearly every facet of
the game from life in the NFL to officiating.51
Second is the close relationship the NFL enjoys with persons and institutions
within the American State. From John F. Kennedy’s signing of the Sports Broadcasting
Bill, which exempted the NFL from anti-trust laws, to the use of Washington Redskins
home games as a key site for lobbyists to entertain members of Congress52, the NFL has
had an intimate connection with the people and institutions of American power. Such a
connection is important as it concerns the countersubversive tradition because it shows
why the NFL would have an interest in promoting ideology which is concurrent with the
goals of countersubversives within the American National Security State apparatus, just
as D.W. Griffith’s relationship with many Progressive reformers played a part in the
construction of his narratives nearly a century earlier. A slightly more contemporary
notion of this idea is evident in Carl Boggs’ study of Pearl Harbor. As Boggs notes,
although Pearl Harbor was a strategic failure for the United States, it is repeatedly
celebrated in countless cultural texts like parades, books, television, and film, as “the
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defining memory of the good war legacy” of the United States.53 Boggs specifically
points out how the symbolism of Pearl Harbor and World War II was played up by the
Bush Administration and television news outlets such as Fox News in advocating the
invasion of Iraq, particularly when talking about a revival of the “Normandy spirit” on
the eve of D-Day in 2003.54 Such programming is highly conducive to countersubversive
ideology, with its emphasis on condensation symbols and desire to make the personal
political.
Methodology
This study is primarily a content-analysis of NFL-films productions—commercial
videos sold for fan consumption. The selection of this media is based on the fact that
NFL films and its founder, Ed Sabol, who for nearly three decades has held the monopoly
on NFL archival footage, have become the definitive lens through which the game, its
history, and its values are portrayed—including in television broadcasts. As Sabol’s son
has noted, the mission of NFL films is to show football through their made for broadcast
programming “the way Hollywood portrays fiction with dramatic flair in a way that
portrays the “beauty” of the game. 55 Additionally, as Michael Oriard notes in Brand
NFL: Making and Selling America’s Favorite Sport, the cinematic techniques spawned
by the Sabols for private home video consumption (multiple camera angles, an emphasis
on close-ups, microphones on coaches and players, melodramatic narration) have become
the standard routines for telecasts of all network games, making live football more
53
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comprehensible to television viewers.56 The way we as audiences experience the “live”
viewing of NFL televised broadcasts and videos cannot be understood without examining
the source which created them and continues to frame them. Perhaps most importantly,
NFL films are the only televised media that is produced exclusively by the League itself,
meaning the images and representations of the sport represent the League and its cultural
significance as seen by those who own it see it—free from any potential transgressive
interpretations or the real experiences of the sport by fans as spectators and consumers.
They are, in short, the official for-profit propaganda arm of the NFL.
Questions examined within this content analysis are a) what specific
characteristics of countersubversion are evident in an NFL Films production? b) What are
the specific condensation symbols used to promote a given countersubversive value? and
c) What are the specific theoretical qualities of these symbols that help make
countersubversive political values retain a sense of intimacy to a viewer? My study is
broken into three chapters divided along countersubversive themes. The first chapter
examines fascination with violence and the use of militaristic imagery in NFL-films
recaps of Super Bowls played during military conflicts. More specifically, I examine how
these recaps utilize a set of militaristic condensation symbols which normalize violence
and fear of boundary invasion by transforming the fictional battlefields of football into
“real” battlefields and thus ready the public for actual military aggression. The second
chapter examines the use of NFL programming as a surveillance tool which reaffirms
traditional paternal hierarchies in society through the ascription of particular
characteristics to executives, coaches, and players. By fixating on ideological aspects of
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these individuals, NFL programming is able to bring the viewer vicariously into the lives
of the NFL’s actors while affixing hierarchies to them representative of a particular
American political nostalgia which affirms a paternalistic world. My third chapter moves
away from the visual slightly to examine other strategies used by the League in its policy
appeals to achieve goals, as well as looking at points of contestation the League faces—
namely in stadium financing and labor policy. My conclusion includes a reaffirmation of
my thesis as well as a brief investigation into the other potential points of contestation
that exist within the NFL which could directly undermine the countersubversive
propaganda the League pushes.
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CHAPTER 1
THE NFL’S MILTARIST PERSUASION

I was hostile to people who were attacking my body, and I still am. When all else fails
and it is obvious that it is going to come down to a direct physical confrontation, I
always thought it reflected a higher degree of intelligence to do the inflicting first.
- Larry Csonka. Former Dolphins RB57
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using
conventional means.
- 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States58

That the National Football League employs the use of violent, militaristic
symbolism and discourse in the dissemination of its product has been recognized by
many within the journalistic and academic community for some time. Journalist Ron
Powers noted that it was the spectacle of violence disseminated through televised
broadcast that gave the League its major foothold in American culture by presenting an
“epic pageant of violence and grace with real fortunes hanging in the balance” that
burned itself into the imaginations of an audience that had been accustomed to the
“prepackaged neutralities” of early television.59 Powers’ comment is instructive in that it
suggests the NFL’s burgeoning cultural power came from its ability to eschew
representations of safety and consensus on television and replace them with images of
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warfare complete with violent imagery and a narrative that emphasized the legitimate
stakes of the outcome of the broadcast.60
In his work on the use of the male body in Monday Night Football broadcasts
during the 1994 season, Trujillo notes that the discourse used to describe the players and
their actions on the field often referred to the players as weapons and their actions as
military maneuvers.
During the season, players were described as "weapons," "missiles," "shields,"
''rockets," "hitting machines," and other instruments of violence. And these
"weapons" engaged in an impressive array of offensive and defensive maneuvers.
For example, among the terms used by MNF commentators to describe what these
offensive and defensive weapons (bodies) did on the football field were attack,
blow away, break through, burst, catapult, club, crash, cripple, crunch, decapitate,
decimate, destroy, dislodge, dislocate, dismantle, drill, explode, fire, fly, hammer,
hit, hurdle, jackhammer, kill, launch, mortar, mug, penetrate, plug, pop, pound,
push, ram, rifle, rip, shoot, shred, slam, slash, smash, smoke, snap, shred, spin,
stearnroll, tattoo, tomahawk, toss, twist, unload, upend, whack, whip, wound, and
wreck.61

Similar findings were evident in a later study by Messner, Dunbar, and Hunt on
what they called they called “the Televised Sports Manhood Formula.” Surveying a
variety of sports broadcasts, the authors found that references to martial metaphors for an
action were used nearly five times per every hour of sports broadcast they analyzed, with
“Monday Night Football” being second only to NBA broadcasts in amount of martial
60
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metaphors used. Moreover, their analysis reinforces the frame of warfare or pageant of
violence that Powers argues made the League the success it is, noting that the “Monday
Night Football” broadcasts were introduced with exploding graphics and a theme song
that included lyrics “Like a rocket burning through time and space, The NFL’s best star
will rock this place…the battle lines are drawn.”62
While such findings are important in showing the specific ways NFL broadcasts
use militaristic imagery, they do little to tell us what precise political utility these
symbols have relative to the larger puzzle of countersubversive elements in the American
political tradition. While Trujillo does argue in part that the valuation of militarism the
NFL promotes may relate to changes of gender relations and female boundary invasion
into male occupations in the 1990s63, such analyses seem insufficient, especially in light
of aforementioned demographic findings that females constitute 50 percent of the NFL
broadcast audience. What then, does the purpose of pushing militaristic symbolism in
NFL broadcasts serve?
The use of militaristic condensation symbols in NFL videography serves the
countersubversive agenda by normalizing militarism as a constitutive part of the
American experience. In doing so, it prepares the audience for mobilization in times of
actual military conflict to more readily accept the binary divisions and fears of alien
invasion created by the countersubversive and the appropriateness of military action
against them. It may also, in times of actual alien penetration, serve to recharge the
legitimacy of the National Security State when its capacity to protect people is brought
62
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into question. In essence, the NFL’s use of militaristic symbols helps to personalize
military conflicts by allowing viewers to experience the nationalistic fervor of real
warfare vicariously by linking it to the viewing of the fictional warfare of pro football.
For evidence of this linkage I employ content-analysis based case studies of two
NFL-Films recaps of Super Bowls XXV, XXXVI played during the military conflicts of
the Gulf War, and the post-9/11 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, respectively. I
then tie my analysis of these events to the NFL-Films-produced documentary Autumn
Ritual and other work in the subject and conclude by examining the multiple roles violent
NFL events play in upholding the countersubversive agenda vis-à-vis the National
Security State, noting how these roles comport with theoretical ideas on the utility of
military spectacle as put forth by Foucault, Rousseau, and Hobbes.
Super Bowl XXV: the Gulf War as a “Struggle of Wills”
The film of 1991 Super Bowl XXV commercial home video begins with a shot of
Eagles Quarterback Randall Cunnigham walking out to the field for the opening day of
the 1990 season as a the music of a church choir is heard in the background. The shot is
followed with a cut to New York Giants players marching out to a vacant stadium as the
sun glares down on their uniforms. As the choir music reaches a crescendo an NFL
football comes into focus. There is then an immediate cut to Bengals coach Sam Wyche
screaming “Bury them! You attack them right in their face!” What follows is three
minutes of clips of various violent plays, with the resultant grunts of pain amplified.
Interwoven between these shots are clips of female fans screaming, “Get him!” as well as
various players and coaches making remarks like, “you can see the fear in his eyes,” and,
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“you have to finish him.” The parade of violent imagery ends with the title “The Road to
the Super Bowl.”64
The introduction to the film is instructive as to how the NFL constructs a warfare
narrative in its product that normalizes the value of combat to its audience. These images
are important because they provide the political setting which is necessary for the value
of war to be internalized and accepted as appropriate. As Edelman notes, political settings
have a contrived character. They are unabashedly built up to emphasize a departure from
daily routine. Massiveness, ornateness and formality are presented on a scale that focuses
on the heroic quality of what is taking place. The creation of this space heightens
sensitivity and conviction among the audience, as the framed actions are no longer
contested but taken on their own terms. Inconsistencies in fact or normal value structure
become irrelevant and thus the stage is set for a concentration of suggestions of emotion
and authority.65
“The Road to the Super Bowl” opening montage demonstrates how the NFL
operates as a political setting where the heroism of the player/soldier is posed against the
backdrop of ultra-violent, visceral action with spectators of both genders gleefully
encouraging the combat. Such a presentation masks the very real contradictions of gender
conflict and the valuations of hierarchy in a liberal regime by obfuscating them in a
visceral, collectivist spectacle. The shots of the marching Randall Cunnigham and Giants
players can be seen to represent the march of soldiers onto the battle field, the sunlight
and choir music are an indication of the moral righteousness of their cause in the
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upcoming battle. The subsequent three-minute visual onslaught of violent plays
interwoven with bloodthirsty cries for more punishment—coming from spectator to
player to coach, from both male and female, helps solidify the normalization of combat
by obscuring hierarchical boundary divisions of participant vs. spectator, masculine vs.
feminine, and commander vs. soldier, folding them into one united mass committed to the
righteous cause of combat displayed before them.
Yet the normalization of combat values is only half the story. For the
countersubversive is not merely employing these values for the sake of maintaining
existing ideological conditions (though that is certainly important) but also to justify real
political action. The illusory warfare of the NFL can thus serve the purpose of justifying
real warfare during times of perceived external threats. This is particularly evident in the
part of the Super Bowl XXV film, “Struggle of Wills” that covers the game itself which
was played during the first Gulf War.66
The game recap opens with the shot of a military helicopter flying overhead with
ominous church bells heard in the background. The narrator remarks, “In a stadium with
tightest security of any NFL game ever played, Super Bowl XXV began under the
shadow of war in the Mideast.” A side shot of the stadium with the NFL logo pans to a
close-up of an American Flag entwined with a yellow ribbon as horns begin to play. The
next three shots show a police officer in a riot mask riding on horseback, fans being
meticulously searched by security guards and a widescreen shot of another Army
helicopter. Concurrent with these shots is a snippet of the radio broadcast of the event
with the announcers saying “We’re about to say a special hello to the men and women of
our armed forces in the Persian Gulf, and we respectfully dedicate our broadcast to you
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wherever you may be over there and may God be with you.” There is a cut to an
interview with a soldier saying “We want to be here because this is our country, we want
to fight for it. Our country is taking care of us making sure we get to watch the Super
Bowl. This is a part of America for us, this is why we’re here.” Underneath him onscreen text reads “Eastern Saudi Arabia, Super Bowl Sunday -0300 hours.”67
This opening scene is illuminating in its depictions of the Super Bowl as a
countersubversive political setting. The first few shots, fixated on the actual agents of the
National Security State apparatus and the “shadow of war” serve to conjure up the fear of
potential boundary invasion by a foreign threat. The radio broadcast snippet, with its wish
that “God be with” the American soldiers overseas solidifies this fear and crates a binary
division between the God-fearing American warrior and the foreign foe who seeks to
penetrate the homeland. The interview with the solider in the war zone seeks to close the
distance between the fictional and real battlefields by making the Super Bowl “part of”
the National Security State itself as something to be protected. In less than three minutes
of film, the Super Bowl is transposed from a game to a part of a larger battlefield against
an ominous alien threat.
When the actual game recap begins, there is roughly two minutes of violent
tackles with the grunts of pain and screams for more punishment from coaches similar to
the opening “Road to the Super Bowl” segment. The narrator remarks, “The silver
anniversary Super Bowl was the most primal of contests, a classic struggle of wills with
each team trying to impose its will on the other.” The subsequent narration of the game
plays upon the theme of struggle and warfare by emphasizing the tactical changes each
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team made in trying to win the game. In describing the Giants’ turnaround in the second
quarter, the narrator notes it was “power football” with “massive blockers whose
intention was to physically wear down the defense” that helped the Giants gain
momentum, as well as the play fake which was turned into one of New York’s “many
lethal weapons.” When Buffalo later scores on a Thurman Thomas run, the narrator calls
it a “crushing blow.” Interwoven between these tactical narrations with allusions to
artillery fire and punishment are scenes of fans wearing small American flags and yellow
ribbons in their hats. The second to last scene ends with the Giants’ celebration and the
narrator saying “it was a game for the ages, but it was played in an atmosphere where
more important events of the day were not forgotten.” The film ends with a freeze frame
of the back of a Giants player holding his child, an American flag in his hand.
If the footage of the event prior to the game serves to transform the Super Bowl
from a fictional to real battle front, the game recap serves to reinforce the superiority of
the American people in their attempt to eliminate the alien threat. The “struggle of wills”
is not simply the struggle of two football teams to win a game, but also is the struggle of
the American will to defeat the will of its enemy on the domestic battlefront. The
military-tactical discourse, as well as the adjectives used to describe players and their
actions (the “Old Stallion” O.J. Anderson, the “methodical” drive of Jeff Hostettler)
denote the martial superiority of the player/soldier in the quest to will their (and the
nation’s) way to victory. This “will” is also reinforced by the shots of spectators waving
flags and ribbons displaying their allegiance to the National Security State and their
refusal to give in to the alien threat that has cast a shadow over the game. That the actual
outcome of the game does not factor into the frame at first would seem contradictory.
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One would assume the victor would be perceived as the personification of the American
will rather than both teams being equally celebrated. This apparent contradiction can be
rectified by the fact that the intent of the football as battlefield symbolism is to raise the
specter of alien penetration by bringing the remote but real battlefield home. The binary
division in this case is not between the squadrons of warriors on the field but between the
Super Bowl and its viewers as collective entity fighting a foreign foe. As will be shown,
this changes somewhat when actual alien penetration does occur within the American
homefront as happened on 9/11.
Super Bowl XXXVI: Creating an Armed Brotherhood
The film begins with a black screen with the words “September 11, 2001.” The
screen fades out to a clip of Giants linebacker Michael Strahan recounting watching the
Twin Towers burn from his balcony, not being able to “conceive the fact they could be
gone.”68 The screen fades to black again before going to a shot of a New York City
firefighter carrying a banner saying “never forget our brothers” marching towards the
viewer somberly. Behind him are a goal post and an American flag. Three more
successive sequences follow with fade-outs and fade-ins of mourning police and other
personnel carrying flags, with one shot of a female officer wiping a tear away. After the
last fade out, there is a shot of Eagles players marching towards a nearly field-long
American flag held by fire-fighters and police officers. The camera pans out to show
New York Giants players also marching towards the flag. The players, now blended in
with the State employees, grasp the flag and begin to make it wave.
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What follows is a minute of shots showing players embracing these same National
Security State employees, a Boy Scout passing out “United We Stand” flyers and
American flags to spectators, close-ups of players on the verge of tears, and players
charging out of their locker rooms holding American flags, screaming loudly. Interwoven
with these shots is audio of President Bush’s speech following the attack “We will not
tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. In all that lies before us, may God grant us
wisdom, and may he watch over the United States of America.” There is then a rapid fire
sequence of shots of spectators carrying patriotic signs and flags as voluminous chants of
“USA! USA! USA! are heard. The montage ends with the 49ers breaking huddle saying
“God Bless America” as the title credits “Road to the Super Bowl” appear on screen.
The “Road to the Super Bowl” montage from the Super Bowl XXXVI recap
provides somewhat of a deviation from its counterpart in Super Bowl X XV. The Super
Bowl XXV “Road to the Super Bowl” opening montage seeks to merely normalize
militarism as a mass cultural value without context—that is, it celebrates violence as a
cultural norm without juxtaposing it against a real particular object or event—only an
imagined one. By contrast, the Super Bowl XXXVI season montage emphasizes the
specific consequences of alien penetration and the need to reconstitute the damaged body
politic. The black opening screen and Michael Strahan’s recount of his inability to
conceive of the absence of the Twin Towers can be seen as a moment where alien
penetration has led to the absence of authority within the polity. The National Security
State has failed in its function to protect its territory and people. Such moments are
problematic because they attack the very foundations of the unimodal value system of a
regime and encourage the now real threat that outsiders may come in and disrupt the
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general consensus of how the authority of the National Security State is understood and
respected.69
What is needed to repair this damage is a militant spectacle which can reassure
the mass of the regime’s legitimacy. Foucault noted how this phenomenon played out
during public executions of the 18th century, calling it a certain mechanism of power “that
asserted itself as an armed power whose functions of maintaining order were not entirely
unconnected with the functions of war; of a power that presented rules and obligations as
personal bonds, a breach of which constituted an offence and called for vengeance.” In
these spectacles, State power is recharged in the ritual display of its reality as
superpower.70 The “Road to the Super Bowl” montage serves this recharging purpose by
intertwining the player-soldiers of the NFL with the citizen-spectators and the agents of
the National Security State into one united display of militant unity. Understood this way,
the sequence of shots in the opening montage takes on new meaning. The shots of the
mourning firefighters and police officers seek to demonstrate the pain of the sovereign at
its failure while not allowing it to forget its purpose. The Eagles and Giants players
marching forward toward and then dispersing into the flag-holding crowd of firefighters,
police officers, and other State officials represents a blending of the fictional warriors
into a constitutive part of the security apparatus. The shots of the Boy Scout passing out
flyers to spectators and the players embracing National Security State workers represents
the renewal of personal bonds and obligations the fictional warriors have in preserving
the legitimacy of the national security apparatus and its workers as well as the duty of the
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citizens to obey and make the State’s pain its own. The spectacle reaches its violent
crescendo with the shots of players charging out of their locker rooms waving flags like a
cavalry riding into battle as spectators chant feverishly. Much like the scaffold executions
of the 18th Century, these acts and images following the political attack on the American
State on 9/11 allow for the vengeance of the people to be become an unobtrusive part of
the vengeance of the Sovereign71 during the real military conflict that is to follow,
fighting the demon vicariously through a show of unity.
This point is illustrated again quite explicitly in the part of the program entitled
“Perspectives.”The program begins with shots of head coaches marching off fields with
somber looks on their faces. The narrator states “On the road to the Super Bowl, the
loneliest figure is often the coach—the man who shoulders the expectations of a season
and bears responsibility when promise turns to disappointment. This season, the
challenge was far greater because suddenly even the winning coaches had to deal with
events beyond their control.” The next scene shows Steelers’ coach Bill Cowher being
informed by a referee that halftime is going to be extended to 14 minutes due to the
beginning of the initiation of the bombing of Afghanistan. The next shot shows Cowher
looking up at President Bush’s address to the nation which is being broadcast on the
scoreboard at Heinz Field, with the president saying, “You have my full confidence and
you will have every tool you need to carry out your duty.” The next shot shows Cowher
addressing his team, huddled around him, saying, “That puts a lot in perspective. But I’m
gonna tell you right now, it’s a great country we live in. And that’s about being together.
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It’s about fighting for a cause. And right now we’re a family, and we’re in our house, and
right now no one’s gonna take it away from us. Let’s go men!”72
This scene shows how the vengeance of the sovereign is projected onto the
vengeance of the people by showing the sovereign (embodied in the president) delegating
authority to the fictional generals and soldiers of the football team. The narrative remark
that “even the winning coaches having to deal with events beyond their control” can be
read as an acknowledgement of the failure of leadership to live up to its duty while
blaming it on unforeseen and alien causes both in the fictional world of football and the
real world of the Security State. That the shot of the president’s address on the scoreboard
pans to Cowher viewing it is of particular importance because it gives the connotation
that the President is giving orders to Cowher, a fictional general, rather than the actual
armed forces. Cowher’s address to his team following Bush’s speech is analogous to a
commander addressing his troops as well as the viewer about the need to come together
as a familial unit to fight for a cause, and to not let the alien penetration take away “our
house.”In transposing the vengeance of the sovereign onto the vengeance of the people
through the coach of a football team, the scene serves two purposes. It not only recharges
the power of the sovereign by reassuring the viewer of the capacity of leadership to cope
with crisis,73 but it also makes the fictional battlefield a part of the real battlefield in the
larger conflict, much like the imagery of the police and army did in the Super Bowl XXV
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program. And, much like that program, it is the game narrative itself that represents the
culmination of this transformation.
The 2002 Super Bowl XXXVI game recap, entitled “Patriots Day,” begins with a
slow pan down to the Super Bowl logo cut-out of the continental United States draped in
red, white and blue. As a somber piano solo plays in the background, the narrator states,
“played before a backdrop of war, Super Bowl XXXVI was a red, white and blue
celebration of a nation’s heritage.” A stadium shot of screaming spectators blends into a
close-up of Paul McCartney onstage shouting “everybody clap your hands for freedom.”
The narration continues “it was also a tribute to the Americans who in 2001 paid the
ultimate price for freedom.” What follows is nearly a minute-long of a shot of a black
banner with the names of 9/11 casualties interwoven with close-ups of players’ tearful
faces. The narrator resumes, “framed against the traumatic events of 9/11, Super Bowl
XXXVI reflected the hope of a nation.” On screen a mosaic picture of the Statue of
Liberty blends into a shot of a re-creation of the raising of the American Flag at Iwo
Jima. The next two scenes show the respective teams coming out of their locker rooms as
the narrator describes the Rams as the “Greatest Show on Turf” while noting the Patriots
were double-digit underdogs. He then adds, “but this team would band together and make
pro-football’s biggest Sunday their own.” The scene ends with the Patriots charging out
of their locker room as a large red, white and blue logo entitled “Patriots Day” morphs
into the Super Bowl XXXVI logo.
Like the Super Bowl XXV “Struggle of Wills,” the opening scene in “Patriots
Day” explicitly notes the game is being played under the backdrop of war, implying the
battlefield of the game is also a battlefield in the actual conflict. However, unlike the
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beginning of the 1991“Struggle of Wills”, which emphasized the omnipresence of the
National Security State in the face of potential alien attack, “Patriots Day” emphasizes
military triumphalism and a celebration of the presumably shared value of freedom. The
difference in imagery has to do with the real political context under which the fictional
battle is taking place. In 1991, the contrived threat of alien penetration is necessary as a
uniting force where real threat is absent and the State is in a superior military position on
the real battlefield. To bring the battlefield home in any convincing terms, the narrative
must emphasize the serious linkage between the distant war and the site of the game. By
contrast, the 2002 narrative need not pay as much attention to the specter of alien
penetration because it has actually occurred. The task of the audio and visual narrative is
to unite the mass after the sovereign has been shown to be weak; to demonstrate a
renewal of commitment to the values of the National Security State by emphasizing
common symbols of past triumph. This framing is important because it compels
attention, emotional release and compliance by addressing the deep and common anxiety
of the alien attack. As Edelman notes, if there is a profound shared faith in a symbol (e.g.
the Statue of Liberty, the Iwo Jima photo) it allows that symbol to become an individual
instrument of the common interest rather than a cognitive and empirical manipulator of
reality.74
Another marked contrast, as alluded to earlier, is the framing of the two teams
relative to the battle narrative. In the case of Super Bowl XXV, both teams are portrayed
equally as embodiments of the American “will” against a foreign agitator. In “Patriots
Day,” the teams are framed in a way that showcases a differential in power and values
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between them. The Rams, previous Super Bowl Champions, are framed as “The Greatest
Show on Turf”. Careful attention is paid to the superior offensive firepower of the team
(they scored 500 points in three consecutive seasons), while the shots of them coming out
of their locker room for the game focus on their individual superstars, and one of the
players’ statements that they are “the best.” The Patriots, by contrast, are branded as
underdogs who needed to “band together” to make Super Bowl Sunday “their own.” The
film makes a careful point to show how the Patriots came out of the locker room “as a
team” and devotes nearly 20 seconds more to their entrance than that of the Rams. The
framing is important because it seeks to add a new binary division in the narrative.
Whereas in Super Bowl XXV the division was between the collective Super Bowl entity
against the foreign threat, the frame in Super Bowl XXXVI is between the teams as
personifications of the real combatants in the actual military conflict. Understood this
way, the offensively powered Rams are a personification of the alien threat with its
haughtiness and capability to strike anywhere. The description of the Rams as the
“Greatest Show on Turf” and the emphasis on their boasts and “explosive multiformation
attack” comports nicely with George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address in January of
2002 when he talked about the “depth of our enemies' hatred in videos, where they laugh
about the loss of innocent life. And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of
the destruction they design.” Emph. added).75
By contrast, the emphasis of the Patriots as a team which would band together
echoes the President’s language in that same speech about America meeting in its “hour
of suffering” and going on to “rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great
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coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed
Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a
country from brutal oppression.”76 The binary division for the narrative is thus the same
as the narrative of the real war where America (embodied in the Patriots) must overcome
the adversity and odds to defeat the arrogant and armed enemy and claim their
improbable yet righteous victory. The narrative of the remainder of the game recap
reflects this division, emphasizing the superiority in both tactic and physicality of the
Patriots over the Rams. Over shots of Patriots players violently hitting their opponents
(complete with amplified pain grunts), the narrator remarks how the Patriots, “jammed,
muscled, then blasted the Ram fleet receivers.” By comparison, the Rams’ first scoring
drive is characterized as “dinky” and the narrator notes that the Patriots defense was a
“puzzle the Rams hadn’t anticipated.” In between shots of violent tackles and tactical
narration are scenes of Patriots coaches admonishing players to turn up the physical
punishment (“pressure in somebody’s face means bad passes”). As the Patriots scoring
play at the end of the first half is replayed five times from five different angles in slow
motion, the narrator remarks “In a Super Bowl steeped in passion and patriotism, the
team flying highest was wearing red, white, and blue.”77
The second half narrative notes how Marshall Faulk, the Rams star running back,
was “buried beneath a wave of red, white, and blue defenders. Even when the Rams
began to mount a comeback in the 4th quarter, the narration refers to their drives as
“stumbling.” Following the Rams’ score to bring the game within a touchdown, Patriots
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defensive coordinator Romeo Crennel is shown screaming, “I need rushers, rushers,
rushers!” The narrator remarks, “New England focused this painful pressure on the
League’s MVP as four consecutive shots of Patriots players hitting Kurt Warner are
shown, the last one a close-up of a Patriots rusher smashing Warner in the face. When the
Rams tie the game with less than two minutes to play, there is a sideline cut to a Rams
player saying the Patriots are “weak” and “overrated.” Following the Patriots’ game
winning field goal, the narrator states that if “dreams are what your heart makes; the
Patriots had the biggest heart in America.” The next scene shows a Patriots’ helmet being
held against a background of red, white, and blue confetti as Patriots owner Robert Kraft
is heard saying “spirituality, faith, and democracy are the cornerstones of our country.
We are all patriots and tonight the Patriots are world champions.” As shots of crying
players are shown, the narrator states “It seemed fitting that in a season of grieving, the
symbol of our nation’s very beginning would be holding the Vince Lombardi trophy at
the end. And like their country, they were proud to be brothers in arms and proud to be
Patriots.” The film ends with the Patriots logo on the Super Dome Scoreboard dimly
visible in a swirl of red, white, and blue.78
The game recap of Super Bowl XXXVI represents the culmination of the
recharging of American superpower seen throughout the 2001 season recap. The
intertwining of the fictional warriors and the National Security State begun on the “Road
to the Super Bowl” and reinforced in “Perspectives” reaches its violent climax on the
fictional battlefield with the victory of a team which is imbued with the condensation
symbols (the minute man logo, red, white and blue uniforms) and values (strength in the

78

Ibid.

41

collective) needed to recharge the body politic following tremendous damage to the
sovereign’s legitimacy. Like public executions, which emphasized the atrocity committed
against the sovereign within the carrying out of justice, the extreme emphasis on the
punishment of the Rams vicariously serves the necessary purpose of allowing the
spectator to experience the punishment of the real enemy in a way that takes
responsibility for the atrocity and all the negative values it embodies such as arrogance
and calculated violence. Like the execution, the emphasis on the pain and impotence of
the Rams provides the spectacle of the game with both truth and power—it is a
culmination of the ritual of the investigation and ceremony in which the sovereign
triumphs.79 No less important is the focus of Robert Kraft’s remarks upon receiving the
Lombardi trophy. While invocations of faith, spirituality and democracy may seem like
tired clichés, even by Super Bowl standards, they hold powerful political importance
because a society’s vocabulary reflects past beliefs and values. Thus the magical
associations that permeate this language are critical for political behavior because they
lend authority to conventional perceptions and values, thus dulling critical faculties
regarding the actual events that precipitated the alien penetration. 80 The legitimacy and
the superpower of the National Security State are recharged through spectacle while the
capacity to conceive of the crisis in any critical light is diminished.
Of course, it could be argued that the documentaries of these Super Bowls and the
warfare framing are more based on market calculations—that is, the NFL is capitalizing
on crisis conditions and cashing in on patriotic sentiment to make a buck rather than
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acting as a deliberate vehicle for countersubversive State war propaganda. While not
denying this as a probability, the NFL’s own commissioned material on its history and
other scholarship suggest that the League takes its goal of promoting American values
seriously somewhat independent of profit as well.81

Autumn Rituals and the NFL’s National Security State Connections
In 1986, NFL Films commissioned what was an allegedly “outsider’s” view of
pro-football in its production of the documentary “Autumn Ritual” that brought together
what it termed a diverse group of “anthropologists, theologians, philosophers, coaches
and players,” to explain the game’s significance in American society.82 In fact, the film
relied heavily on commentary from right-wing speakers, from George Will to Jerry
Falwell to convicted criminal G. Gordon Liddy. Nevertheless, the film is provocative in
demonstrating how conscious the League (or at least its players, coaches, and high-profile
fans) is of its role in creating a normalization of warfare within society and in many ways
how it openly embraces its role as a proponent for the National Security State in times of
crisis. One segment of the film begins with a clip of soldiers drilling in Vietnam that cuts
to Vikings’ players lined up in a similar military formation on the sidelines before a
game. The scene then cuts to an interview with former player Alex Karras saying “you
are playing the game of war, and it isn’t with guns, but everything else is the same.” The
film then cuts to more stock footage of soldiers running through the Vietnamese jungle
81
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shouting, “Everybody move out-get out there,” before cutting back to Buccaneers players
marching on the field. The next 10 minutes of the film feature the same pattern with shots
of Vietnam combat mixed with violent game footage and commentary by various experts
woven in between. Of the more noteworthy comments are the ones offered by G. Gordon
Liddy and former player and assistant coach Bill Curry. Liddy, in explaining the appeal
of football as a war game says, “If you look at the history of man, the history of man is
warfare—most men wish they could do things like that…it is an aggressive intelligence.
It is competitiveness. It is combativeness…the operating principle is Social Darwinism,
we are all in competition.” Later, Curry says “Something goes on in the huddle that’s
magic. You take a huddle on a football field and it’s made up of black children and white
children, northerners and southerners, and liberals and conservatives and they are forced
not only to get along but to help each other…so you’re not just tolerated, you’re
accepted. Here we are in the same colored jerseys, same colored helmets, this crazy
coach is screaming at us and driving us up and down the field and we become
brothers…all those racial, religious and ethnic differences that kept people apart before
are beginning to come apart and a great thing happens—men become brothers in huddles.
And when you leave that huddle, you never quite find it the same again.”83
The framing of the similarity between football and warfare—of the transformation
of the fictional battlefield to the real battlefield is, as has been demonstrated by previous
examples, part and parcel of NFL films videography of the League. Yet it takes on a
remarkable self-consciousness here. Karras’ comment that with exception of guns (and
lethality) that war and football are “the same” shows how the players in the spectacle
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understand their role as fictional soldiers and conveys the “reality” of NFL combat to the
audience. But it is Liddy’s and Curry’s comments that strike at the theoretical heart of
why the NFL is so important as an instrument of countersubversive ideology—its ability
to mask real conflicts of a society in spectacle. Liddy’s remarks on the history of man
being warfare and competition is a not so subtle reiteration of the view of the problem of
human nature most famously put forth by Hobbes. If men are inherently driven to quarrel
by “first competition, secondly difference, and thirdly glory” and if such a predisposition
leads to” war of every man against every man,”84 where no action is unjust and right and
wrong are irrelevant, there needs to be a common power to keep them in awe.85 To
Hobbes, this awe-inspiring power was to be given to the sovereign of the commonwealth,
whose power and strength and the terror thereof would keep people in line out of fear.86
Of course, the Hobbesian prescription works only so far as the sovereign is able to
command the terror and respect of the citizens without having to pay deference to
concepts of individualism and the concurrent inequalities and value differences the liberal
polity creates. Moreover, if the sovereign fails in its duty (as happened on 9/11 in the
United States) it allows for the dangerous proposition that people may question the very
legitimacy of the sovereign’s right to rule. What is then needed is a power that can inspire
awe as well as mediate value conflicts while still upholding, if not celebrating, the
legitimacy of the sovereign—in this case the American National Security State.
The “magic” that Bill Curry talks about is the mechanisms by which the NFL is
able to complete this task. The identical uniforms eliminate the conflicts of racism and
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sectionalism otherwise apparent in American political life. The “crazy coach” leading
players up and down the sideline becomes a proxy for the actual sovereign as an awe
inspiring figure who can command the terror of his subjects (and by association the
audience) into obedience. The results of this are the acceptance of all rather than merely
the toleration of difference. Individuals, their differences in equality and station, are
rendered indifferent in the envelopment of the violent spectacle of the game. That the
NFL explains and celebrates this in its own productions is a powerful statement of how
the League views its function within contemporary American political life—and indeed
its relationship with the National Security State itself. As Samantha King has noted,
following the 9/11 attacks and the declaration of the War on Terror (and then the war in
Iraq), the NFL began incorporating Bush administration foreign policy into its own
business promotion. Following the attacks and prior to the previously analyzed Super
Bowl XXXVI, the NFL made a multimillion dollar commitment to increasing tourism in
New York City as well as setting up its own disaster relief fund. These events culminated
in the League’s first Kickoff Weekend extravaganza, featuring several popular music acts
and celebrities. The event was billed as a “tribute to the American Spirit, the resiliency of
New Yorkers, and the fact the post-9/11 New York City remains one of the premier
tourist destinations in the world.” King notes the NFL’s efforts fit the dominant domestic
national response advocated by the Bush administration following the attacks,
encouraging people to do good for others while at the same time going about their
everyday practices of consumption.87
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The League’s connection with the National Security State was sharpened even
further in 2003 following the invasion of Iraq when the League collaborated with Bush
Administration officials to present what was called, “Operation Tribute to Freedom,” a
program designed to “reinforce the bond between the citizen and the military” and “help
Americans express their support for the troops who are returning from operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and who continue to fight in the ongoing effort toward victory in the
global war on terrorism.” The event, which was the brainchild of then-NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue and Gen. Richard Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, began with a ceremony at the Oval Office where NFL Executives met with George
W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, and Colin Powell and presented the President
with a football which bared the inscription “the first football of the 2003 season,
presented to President George W. Bush with appreciation.” The program culminated with
a large-scale celebration on the National Mall co-sponsored by Pepsi, and included
performances by Britney Spears, Aerosmith, Mary J. Blige, and Aretha Franklin, who
sang the national anthem. The 300,000-strong crowd included 25,000 troops and their
families shipped in for the event by the Department of Defense with the promise of a free
t-shirt and prime concert viewing. Publicity material produced by the League stated the
purpose of this “new tradition” was to “celebrate the resilient and indomitable spirit of
America.”88
King’s examination of League press releases suggests the NFL demonstrably
recognizes its role as a supercharger for the sovereign’s power in times of crisis. And as
King notes, that it has a “new capacity as something akin to a for-profit marketing arm of
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the government, immersed in ongoing relationships with a variety of departments and
offices [so that] we might think of the NFL as a Department of Propaganda, neoliberal
style89. Indeed, its own films reflect that purpose.

Conclusion: NFL Military Spectacle for the National Security State
Writing in 1758, Rousseau noted the utility of military spectacle in creating a united
polity:
Why should we not found, on the model of military prizes, other prizes for
gymnastics, wrestling, running, discus, and the various bodily
exercises…all of the festivals of this sort are expensive only insofar as one
wishes them to be, and the gathering alone renders them quite
significant…the people are lively, gay, tender; their hearts are then in their
eyes as they are always on their lips…all societies constitute but one, all
become common to all.90

Rousseau keenly understood the stabilizing effect military spectacle-like games
could have in masking the true identity conflicts one finds in a political State with little to
no real political or economic equality.91 The NFL performs this function today in the
National Security State by creating a fictional battle-complete with its own warriors, that
normalizes violence into liberal culture, while simultaneously masking the real effects of
it by enveloping its citizens into one mass audience united in celebration of militarist
spectacle. The NFL aids the countersubversive in the National Security State by
providing a site where the practitioner of demonology can raise the specter of alien
89
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penetration—fictional or real—and mobilize the public into a defiant mass, as well as
recharge the State’s superpower in crises of legitimacy. It is conscious of this role and
embraces it openly in its own videography and in its open relationship with members of
the Security State. It is war, and it isn’t with guns, but everything else is the same.
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CHAPTER 2
VALUATION OF HIEARCHICAL ORDER: THE NFL’S PASTORAL IDEAL

“The NFL has…stability commensurate with its unparalleled success. Each NFL team
that fortifies the league rim has a personality as distinctive as its uniform. Yet there is an
unwavering commitment to preserving the integrity of the whole.”
—“This is the NFL 2008-2009” 92
“On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over
conflict and discord.”—Barack Obama, Inaugural Address93
In Autumn Ritual, George Will argues the appeal of the NFL comes from its
ability to reintroduce the “heroic dimension” back to the “dreadful tranquility” of modern
ordered life by offering a product that combines violence punctuated by committee
meetings.”94 Will’s observation is important as it concerns the NFL’s relation to the
countersubversive tradition because it articulates the task the countersubversive faces in
affirming hierarchical relations of power by constructing myths that appeal to liberal
sensibilities of individuality, while simultaneously assuring the audience remains passive
and subject to the paternal orderings by which they are governed. As Rogin states, the
power of film and mass media more generally as a surveillance tool comes from its
power to absorb a viewer into the fictional world while also acknowledging to some
extent the reality of the ideal figures it presents.

The split between the star’s life on-and off-screen is joined to another division
within film itself. The moviegoer not only sees an ideal self; he or she also
observes forbidden acts that can be enjoyed at a distance, protecting the ideal self
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from contamination. In that mode the motion picture viewer resembles the
surveillant. Voyeurism protects the self from both participation and observation.95

In simpler terms, media’s surveillance power, that is, its power to act as a sort of
overseer of general opinion on political issues, is derived from its ability to allow the
average viewer to experience the lives of those in higher stations without having to give
them the real spaces of participation in which to achieve them. It ensures the continued
maintenance of the hierarchies of society by allowing people to experience their mythic
power vicariously. NFL films serve as an agent of surveillance for the countersubversive
practitioner in this capacity by creating programming with narratives about owners,
executives, and coaches that emphasizes particular personality traits representative of a
type of nostalgia which depicts them as leaders in a protective, paternal world, what
Rogin refers to as the pastoral hero characterization.96 The need for the idyllic political
pastoral hero comes from the desire to tame the wilderness of uncertainty that comes
from political modernization. While in past literature this was emphasized through
iconography such as the West and the childlike, cannibalistic Indian incapable of selfgovernance, in the case of NFL filmography, the dangers of the wilderness are
represented by the players, who in their own on-and-off the field depictions are shown as
childlike, violent, and incapable of great performance absent the paternal surveillance
provided by the pastoral leader embodied in the coaches, owners and executives in the
League hierarchy. The power of NFL programming as a surveillance mechanism operates
by first bringing the viewer into the lives of the NFL’s actors while affixing
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characteristics to them that represent a particular American political nostalgia which
affirms a paternalistic world.
In examining these facets of the NFL as a hierarchy-affirming surveillance tool, I
look at the NFL-films produced NFL’s Greatest Players and Coaches, noting how the
characteristics that define the “greatness” of owners and executives—chiefly paternal
surveillance and leadership, align with the qualities inherent in pastoral heroism. I then
examine clips of NFL players from Autumn Ritual as well the Super Bowl XXIX and
XXXI, paying attention to how the players are ascribed characteristics that necessitate a
pastoral figure’s authority over them. I then examine how the pastoral ideal is portrayed
in head coaches, paying particular attention to how the Foucualdian concept of
normalization, which creates systems of evaluation that induce conformity through
discipline of the body, are lauded as evidence of a coach’s greatness as a pastoral figure. I
conclude by demonstrating how these characterizations affect the viewer’s larger
perception and acquiescence to paternal ordering hierarchy in actual political
presentation.
The Greatest: Owners and Executives as Pastoral Heroes
The segment of “The Greatest Players and Coaches” film which examines
coaches and executives begins with a brief scene of a faded locker room and the title logo
“The Men Behind the Men.” The scene cuts to a close-up of a flag of the NFL shield
flying in the wind. The shot pans out to show the NFL flag parallel to the American flag
at Soldier Field in Chicago as the narrator states, “The NFL flag flies highest over
Chicago, Illinois.” The shot fades to the lone figure of late Chicago Bears owner and
founder George Halas, whom the narrator calls “one of the most important men in the
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history of pro football.” The next minute of film contains footage of Halas’
accomplishments as an owner and coach, mixing decades-old footage with commentary
by Halas on his founding of the franchise. Over footage of Hall of Fame players like Dick
Butkus, the narrator notes that it was Halas’ ability to “produce” players and defenses
that could “strangle and mangle opponents” which made him a successful coach and the
“father of pro-football.” The scene ends with an interview with the late Hall of Fame
running back Red Grange discussing Halas’ numerous roles within the Bears
organization, concluding, “he was a one man gang.”97
The next scene begins with a close-up of late Pittsburgh Steelers founder and
owner Art Rooney. The narrator states “Art Rooney was the patriarch of the Pittsburgh
Steelers and one of pro football’s most revered owners.” After a successive sequence of
shots detailing Rooney’s management of the Steelers from one of the worst franchises in
the game to “one of the greatest,” the film cuts to footage of the Steelers’ victory in Super
Bowl IX and an interview with former Steelers’ linebacker Andy Russell relating how
after the Steelers’ first Super Bowl victory he realized he had to give the game ball to
“The Chief.” The narrator then states, “He won four Super Bowls, but it was his
generosity and love for his players that set him apart from other owners….he was a man
as great outside of the game as he was inside of it, a true man of the people.” The scene
cuts to an interview with Hall of Fame Defensive Tackle Joe Greene who remarks that
Rooney “knew every player…he didn’t talk to you and look away, not look you in the
eye, and he did that when he walked through the community. His community.”
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These opening scenes of the “Men Behind the Men” segment are important in that
they suggest to the audience the importance of pastoral qualities and how deeply they are
intertwined with surveillance and order. The title of the segment establishes that the
“greatness” of men is overseen by other men—individuals operating behind the scenes
who, through their surveillance of those lower than them, mold a chaotic mass into
something functional. As Rogin notes, one of the characteristics of the pastoral hero
archetype in American politics is his ability to “create domestic national order and
purpose” in the same vein as earlier leaders conquered nature in the nineteenth century.
The modern model of technological liberal reform reflects pastoral childhood dreams of
patriarchal control over uncertain frontiers.98
In the case of the scene on George Halas, the close-up of the NFL flag running
parallel to the American flag that “flies highest” over the home of the “father of profootball” not only creates the perception of the equivalency of the NFL to the American
State (much as the militaristic and nationalistic imagery did in the previously studied
Super Bowl films), but also locates the power of the NFL’s founding in a lone patriarchal
figure, analogous to the 19th Century frontiersmen entering and sanctifying the wilderness
or the Progressive Era reformer instilling discipline on a burgeoning empire and the new
domestic corporate-capitalist system.99 The interview with Red Grange in which Halas is
described as a “one man gang” who oversees and “takes care of” every aspect of the
franchise from the ticket sales to the police at Wrigley Field, combine with the shots of a
solitary Halas walking on Soldier Field to complete the transformation of the owner into
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the idyllic hero by creating a dramaturgical impression based on popular characterisitcs
associated with effective authority.100
Linguist George Lakoff notes that the moral authority of the patriarchal figure is
derived in part from the authority figure’s ability to know what is best for the community
and the person subject to authority as well as the social recognition that the authority
figure has responsibility for the well-being of the community and the person subject to
authority.101 The scene on Art Rooney shows how his success as an owner and his moral
authority are derived from his ability to purportedly “know” every player and to walk
through “his community.” It is through this knowing, achieved through the surveillance
of the team (which in the narrative becomes his community), that the “patriarch” of the
Steelers is able to achieve success. Of course, as the narrator’s statement about Rooney
being “set apart” from other owners implies, his surveillance needs to be perceived as a
virtue that works for a greater community. It must not only be equated with the success of
victory but also have a moral quality that demonstrates an overall unity of form that
makes an entity strong and resistant to uncertain pressure—what Lakoff refers to as
“Moral Wholeness.”102 This particular characteristic, while not particularly elaborated on
in the film, is a fixture of media coverage of the Rooney family, coverage of the Steelers’
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prior to their Super Bowl XLIII appearance noting “The Rooney name is synonymous
with stability, which is rare in the era of the quick fix.”103
If NFL owners are depicted as having moral authority primarily through their
ability to survey and order the nascent communities that their football teams represent,
executives are shown as deriving their moral authority from the capacity to take these
communities and become leaders who innovate while maintaining the traditions of
surveillance first established by patriarchs like Halas and Rooney. In the case of NFL
executives, this is evidenced in the scene focusing on the first two commissioners of the
League, Bert Bell and Pete Rozelle. The segment on Burt Bell opens with a wide shot of
a crowd gathered in Narbeth, Pennsylvania where against the backdrop of red, white and
blue bunting, a plaque is unveiled honoring his historic accomplishments. The scene cuts
to a close-up of former Eagles president Harry Gamble noting how Bert Bell “did it all.
He sold the tickets. He coached the team. And he brought the gate receipts home in a
cigar box.” There is then a cut to former Eagles center Chuck Bednarik, a close-up of
Bell’s face behind him saying “the old-timers know and I hope these guys playing today
remember a guy by the name of Bert Bell. If it wasn’t for him you wouldn’t be a
millionaire.” The next five shots are of various executives and journalists as well as
Bell’s daughter, all commenting on Bell’s personal characteristics as they related to
establishing the League. Of particular note are comments made by a former executive and
one sports journalist. Former Raider’s executive Al LoCasale states “Bert Bell was a guy
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who, for the first time, people could point to in football, as they had in baseball with
[former Baseball Commissioner] Landis and they knew who was in charge.” Journalist
Larry Merchant, when discussing Bell’s draft system,104 notes that “it led us to a future
where New York was not the center of the universe anymore…that you could play in
Green Bay or anywhere else and become a national figure.” His daughter Jane says, “He
dearly loved the football players. He would always conclude his talks with the teams
with, ‘this is my home phone number. If you have any problems at all, you can call me at
anytime of the day or night.’” The scene on Bell ends with a return to the speech by
Gamble, stating “he targeted all his hopes and ambitions, his dreams and his struggles to
professional football. He took a game and made it America’s passion.” Interwoven with
speech are shots of players from the 1950s to the late 1990s running onto the football
field. The segment ends with a shot of an anonymous fan holding a large American flag
as the shot pans down to the football field.105
The segment immediately following the profile on Bell begins with a marching
procession of banners of each NFL team’s logo. The narrator states, “While Bert Bell
made the NFL a popular sport, Commissioner Pete Rozelle made it number one,
replacing baseball as America’s favorite pastime.” The next shot shows an upward angle
of a flagpole with the United States’, State of California’s, and the NFL’s flags all flying
in the wind. Over stills of Rozelle shaking hands with various owners, Hall of Fame
Cowboys President Tex Schramm says “He [Rozelle] was able to accomplish things
because he was able to bring diverse groups of egotistical, strong-minded owners and
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managers together and do things that were necessary for the betterment of the League—
not necessarily the individual clubs and he was the glue—he made it work.” As Schramm
talks about Rozelle’s creation of the Super Bowl and his ability to turn it into an
“international event,” a wide stadium shot cuts to close-ups of telecasters from around the
world touting the game. As shots of Rozelle conferring with various players, owners and
coaches such as Vince Lombardi roll, former Giants’ General Manager George Young
states, “If you think in terms of egos of coaches and egos of players, egos of player union
and egos of owners, and having to massage all the different people he’s had to massage
and then to have some policies that move you in the same direction that’s a great
accomplishment.” As a still of Rozelle meeting with Lyndon Johnson is shown, Young
states, “I mean politicians don’t last that long—who lasts in office 30 years having to do
that kind of massaging and manipulating? The scene ends with an interview with late
49ers coach Bill Walsh stating” I think he’s brought a serenity, a calmness to a sport that
obviously has violence and is so competitive that sometimes the worst side of people
show. He’s brought grace and style to that and if the public has been more responsive to
the National Football League it’s because of Pete Rozelle.”
The scenes on the NFL’s first two commissioners demonstrate at once the
political necessity and paradoxes of leadership as a political symbol. As Edelman notes
the central connotation of leadership is innovation: leaders point the way so that others
can emulate their initiatives. At the same time, political leaders must conform to widely
held ideology in order to succeed and maintain their higher office. Yet it is these apparent
contradictions that give the symbol of the leader its great political utility. Leaders win
their acclaim (and thus their authority) and their followers gain their reassurance and
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hope through courses of action that reaffirm accepted ideologies while connoting
boldness, intelligence, change, and paternal protection. Leaders, in essence, become
symbolic representations which make a complex and largely unknowable world
understandable by becoming objectifications of whatever pleases or worries observers
because it is easy to identify with them, support or oppose them, love or hate them.106
This concept is played out in the scene on Bert Bell first through the framing of
the commissioner as a political hero, as evidenced by the public honoring of the man
complete with the requisite red, white, and blue décor, and then through the rhetorical
emphasis on Bell as a paternal surveillance figure who, much like the one-man gang
Halas, “did it all” when it came to running the League. Moreover, his “love” for the
football players and his willingness to give his phone number out can be seen as
analogous to Art Rooney’s ability to “know” every player in “his community.” In this
way, the tradition of surveillance established by the patriarchs Halas and Rooney is
carried on by Bell while at the same time he is praised for leading the NFL into the future
by creating a system where players could become national figures and the League could
become more profitable.
The leadership frame is completed by the comments from Bednarik and LoCasale,
who speak of Bell as an objectification of the leadership traits of change and
accountability respectively. Bednarik’s admonishment to younger players about their
wealthy status being owed to Bell can be seen as a projection of the change characteristic
of leadership put onto Bell even if such a frame does not align with actual history.107
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LoCasale’s comments about Bell being a figure people could point to and know was in
charge are important in that the assumption of responsibility is key. In a world where
general uncertainty is the rule, people who feel burdened by the responsibility of making
difficult choices about their own lives and the lives of others can transfer that onus on to
the leader.108 Understood this way, Gamble’s concluding remark that Bell “targeted all
his hopes and ambitions, his dreams and his struggles” to the NFL is, in fact, a projection
of the collective struggles of a burgeoning sports league onto one man who becomes the
symbol of effective leadership for his organization.
If the qualities of the executive as leader frame are established in the Bell scene,
they are solidified if not reified in the scene on Pete Rozelle. The opening shots of the
marching NFL banners and waving flags can be seen to represent the League’s cultural
power as a fictional military arm of the American State as well as the visual placement of
the NFL as America’s pastime. Like the scene on Bell, these shots (along with the still of
Rozelle with President Johnson) also depict Rozelle as not only a sports figure but a
political figure as well. What reifies Rozelle as a model political leader for the League is
the imagery and language used in regard to how he managed the League hierarchy. As
Edelman notes, it is expected that the top executive in every large-scale organization will
periodically proclaim his willingness, even eagerness to take personal responsibility for
the acts of subordinates. Such an approach helps strengthen the leader’s authority by
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ascribing the ability to cope to the leader while protecting subordinates from
accountability or blame for incompetence or inability to perform their functions.109
As the comments by Schramm, Young, and Walsh indicate it was precisely
Rozelle’s ability to assume (or at least project) responsibility that made him an effective
leader for the NFL. Schramm’s comments about Rozelle’s ability to be “the glue” which
bonded diverse “strong minded” owners and managers together for the betterment of the
League is an acknowledgment of Rozelle’s ability to assume responsibility for the
inability of subordinate pieces of the League and to overcome conflicts of narrow selfinterest in order to better its standing in the public mind and consumer market. Young’s
comments and the shots of Rozelle conversing with coaches, in boardrooms and on the
sidelines, articulate the specifics of how Rozelle was able to assuage the subordinate parts
of the NFL (owners, coaches, players) by “manipulating and massaging” their egos
through his administrative responsibilities as the NFL’s chief executive. Using the power
of the administrative agency allows adversary groups to oppose each other in a forum
which replaces tension with a measure of clarity, meaning confidence, and security.110 By
assuming the responsibility of being an iconic administrative figurehead for the League,
Rozelle was able to allow conflicts to be resolved by injecting his personal characteristics
into the administrative process, thus manipulating disparate subordinate parts into some
semblance of unity of purpose.111 As Young’s comments infer, his success in doing so,
and in turn his success as a political leader as opposed to failed political leaders like
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Johnson), is measured by the length of his incumbency, which connotes an ability to act
when others are bewildered.112
Bill Walsh’s comments complete the frame of Rozelle as a reified leader by
throwing them against the Hobbesian backdrop the NFL operates under. Like G. Gordon
Liddy beforehand, Walsh reaffirms the view that the NFL is a dramaturgical
representation of Hobbes’ state of war, punctuated by violence and competition, in need
of some force to inspire awe in order to bring together its anarchic parts. However, in an
organizational form which rests to some degree on consent of its membership (be it an
association like the NFL or a liberal State), the Hobbesian prescription of direct terror
becomes unfeasible, therefore a leader must find other means by which to gain the
acquiescence of those who would be subordinated to him. As the comments from
Schramm, Young, and Walsh indicate, the perception of Rozelle was that he was able to
overcome the egos of disparate parts of the League by transposing his personality onto
the organization. In doing so he was assuming responsibility for the public face of the
League which, in turn, allowed him to manipulate potentially antagonistic subordinates
with assurances that, in accepting his policies, they were assuaging themselves of
responsibility for any of their individual actions, which would otherwise have damaged
the perceived integrity of the game.
What is particularly noteworthy about the efficacy of this type of leadership is
that its uses passivity rather than aggression to accomplish its goals. As previously noted,
Hobbesian understanding of unity implies the direct use of force in order to keep
individuals together through fear. The passive leadership style as exemplified by Rozelle,
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by contrast, relies largely on appearance and downplaying of controversy to achieve
consensus. As stated by Edelman, this style consists of the avoidance of firm positions
on controversial subjects while at the same time posturing as a protagonist against an
evanescent enemy, thereby retaining or increasing political support from large numbers
of antagonists on both sides of controversies. Edelman sees Eisenhower and Kennedy as
exemplars of this style in the modern presidency.
Such a leader may declare he will support the law of the land while refusing to
endorse the morality of the Supreme Court desegregation decision. He may, like
Kennedy, firmly and frequently declare that government has a responsibility to
support prosperity and quicken economic growth while refraining from
embarking on controversial economic policies to increase productivity or cut
unemployment. The chief executive may maintain his ‘symbolic leadership’
through ascriptions of his ability to cope, through publicized action on
noncontroversial policies or on trivia, and through a dramaturgical performance
emphasizing traits popularly associated with leadership…113

In the case of Rozelle, much of his ability to manage egos came from his ability to
present himself as a guardian against the evanescent threats to the integrity of the game
(gambling, labor unrest, drug abuse), while essentially doing very little to address the
substance of the perceived threats, leaving such tasks to subordinates or producing
comparatively mild sanctions or investigations into these issues.114 It is perhaps not
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surprising then, in the scene speaking of Rozelle’s ability to last longer than most
politicians, that he is juxtaposed against Lyndon Johnson, a failed political leader who
pursued controversial domestic (particularly progressive racial) and foreign policies that,
rather than glossing over the concerns of potential antagonists with “grace and style,”
took them head on into political ruin. As Walsh’s comments make clear, Rozelle
succeeded because he made the public more responsive to the NFL through the
appearance of calmness and serenity. Thus in a tumultuous time of numerous scandals
and evidence that the game as both sport itself and as a cultural icon was suffering from
severe structural issues that could damage its legitimacy, not to mention the bodies of the
players that made it popular in the first place, Rozelle came across as a responsive
executive who remained positive about his product in spite of it all. Such a frame is a
marked contrast from the one ascribed to the foundation of the League as
entertainment—its players.
Pastoral Objects: The Primitive Player
As noted by Rogin, the countersubversive tradition, which defines itself against
alien threats to the American way of life and sanctions violent and/or exclusionary
policies towards them, began with a fear of “primitivism and disorder” in response to the
peoples of color that inhabited the continent as natives or slaves. In the case of the Indian
in early America, they came to embody the “masterless men,” emblematic of chaos who,
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in European culture represented the breakdown of traditional society. Allegedly living
without government and freed from European constraints of family, church, and village,
they were depicted as “idle, wandering savages” who engaged in incest, cannibalism,
devil worship and murder.115 And while some early writers wrote of the nobility of the
savage, it was never divorced from the needs of the white American power structure.
Both images of primitivism appropriated Indians for white purposes. Both made
the Indians children of nature instead of creators and inhabitants of their own
cultures…Neither the noble nor the devilish savage could coexist with the
advancing of white civilization. Both images rationalized the dispossession of the
tribes.116

Similarly, blacks, who were often stereotyped as sexual predators, also posed a
primitive threat to the social order—though not through the threat of freedom but the
threat of reversing labor dependency.117 While some of the nastier illustrations of these
particular cases have to some degree been downplayed in popular culture as time has
progressed, the base fears of primitivism and social upheaval they were associated with
are still well at work within popular culture today and particularly evident in NFL
filmography as it concerns the foundation of the NFL as popular entertainment—its
players.
Evidence of this notion is found in the beginning of the Autumn Ritual
documentary and “The Road to the Super Bowl” segments in the Super Bowl XXIX, and
XXXI recaps. Autumn Ritual begins with a stock footage shot of a naked African child
walking out of a hut. The shot then cuts to Oakland Raiders players walking out of a
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locker room tunnel onto the football field. The next 20 seconds alternate between
successive shots of tribal children engaged various activities (face painting, marching,
chanting, and violent play) and NFL players doing nearly mirror actions. Later, former
Bengals coach Sam Wyche talks about the ritual of offensive linemen known as
“grazing” where players would stand around prior to game time. His description
coincides with close-up shots of players chewing gum which then cuts to footage of an
Ox chewing cud. Conservative theologian Michael Novak then remarks that one of the
great appeals of football is its “celebration of the elemental physical life, the elemental
lusts and hates and fears.” He states “beyond any theory of enlightenment or liberalism or
rationality there are enacted in football elemental passions and elemental desires.” Over
his words are shots of players involved in fights, violent tackles, and aggressive entrances
onto the playing field.118
Novak’s comments are provocative in that they illuminate the paradox the
countersubversive faces in the creation of texts: on the one hand, it is the showcasing of
the primitive or the elemental which often gives a text its mass appeal. On the other hand,
it is precisely these elemental passions, what Rogin calls “the regressive impulses” to the
primitive or communal versus the independent and isolated which the countersubversive
practitioner seeks to combat. This paradox is reconciled by presenting otherwise
appealing primitive characters as child-like or animalistic and in need of some parental
figure. In the case of the Autumn Ritual narrative, the film draws parallels between
football players as primitive children or animals who thrive on aggression. This
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conception is expanded upon in “The Road to the Super Bowl Recaps” for games XXIX
and XXXI respectively.
The “Road to the Super Bowl” segment for Super Bowl XXIX includes a segment
on what is deemed the “maturing” process of an NFL quarterback, particularly the
“emotional pressures” they endure. As a shot of a young Brett Favre being sacked is
shown, the narrator notes that a quarterback “must learn to crawl” before he can run, and
that when he “takes those first steps, he is like a puppy dog chasing his tail.” The scene
cuts to then-Packers coach Mike Holmgren exasperated at Favre, telling him to settle
down. The narrator states, with “Mike Holmgren’s help Brett Favre finally reached
football puberty.”119 The message is clear. Absent the paternal authority of a coach, a
player is limited in intelligence or capability and cannot grow to the potential needed for
his position.
It is further honed in the “Road to the Super Bowl” for Super Bowl XXXI in a
segment entitled “The Sting.” The segment begins with NFL films President Steve Sabol
explaining how “head coaches were expected to win with new players and many of those
players were not easy to coach.” The segment then cuts to successive shots of players like
Deion Sanders dancing on the field, Brett Favre playing air guitar, a Cowboys lineman
calling himself ‘sexy,’ and two Bills players embracing and kissing each other on the
cheek. The narrator states, “Today’s NFL player is high-profile, a product of free agency
and freedom of expression.120 He is self-assured, sheltered, and sensitive.” The next
sequence of shots shows players with face paint, afro-hair styles, and coach Marty
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Schottenheimer angrily pointing out to a player on the sideline that he has an earring on.
The segment ends with the narrator stating “each year it gets tougher to build a team for
the embattled head coach.”121 Like the Super Bowl XXIX segment, “The Sting” shows
the players as having childlike qualities of egotism and sensitivity that need to be
overcome by embattled head coaches. The painted faces, wild hairdos, and dances invoke
the specter of primitivism first shown in the juxtaposition of shots of tribal children and
players in Autumn Ritual.
“The Sting” segment also adds the threat of sexuality into the primitive fear
narrative. Players, in the case of the shots here, all African American players, are shown
expressing sexuality (“I’m sexy”) and in the case of the Bills players what could be
interpreted as a homosexual act. Such scenes not only evoke (however subtly) the already
ingrained stereotype which associated blacks and sexual deviancy, but also challenge the
pastoral/Strict Father frame by challenging the base assumption that sex is heterosexual
sex in which men are dominant over women and that this natural order carries over to the
moral order.122 Men affirming feminine qualities become part of what is “embattling” to
the paternal figure, in this case the head coach. In framing the players as childlike, sexual
and primitive the narratives of these segments reinforce the necessity of the hierarchical
structure the League, as well as most corporate-capitalist enterprises operates under.
Without it, sensitive, sheltered workers would revert to primitive, anarchic tendencies. A
figure is required who can justify or neutralize these tendencies by acting on the bodies
and minds of the players—in the case of the NFL, the head coach.
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Head Coaches and the Process of Normalization
Returning to the “Men Behind the Men” segment in the NFL’s Greatest Players
and Coaches, I have shown how different parts in the NFL hierarchy derive their
authority in the tradition of pastoral heroes. For owners, moral authority is derived
through the power to order new frontiers through the surveillance of the nascent
communities they found. For executives, moral authority is derived from their capacity to
be seen as leaders who innovate on the foundations set forth by the patriarchs while
simultaneously keeping up the appearance of tradition and integrity of the game often
through the passive projection of responsibility and ability to cope with outside threats.
For the coach, often the most visible position in the NFL hierarchy, moral authority is
derived from the ability to create systems of normalization which, in turn, docilize
players so they can be molded into successful teams. Of the coaches profiled in the “Men
Behind the Men” segment, two stand out as the exemplars of these qualities: Paul Brown
and Chuck Knoll.
Paul Brown and the Creation of Normalization
The scene on Paul Brown opens with a black and white still of the late coach as
the narrator states, “Paul Brown was one of the greatest coaches in pro-football history.”
Over grainy footage of an old Cleveland Browns game, the narrator states “all football
came from Amos Alonzo Stagg [the first paid coach in American football history], but
pro football came from Paul Brown.” Over alternating black and white shots of Brown on
the sidelines, doing calisthenics with his players and watching as players hit dummies in
practices, the narrator states, “Brown was also a great innovator. He called all the
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Browns’ plays and used messenger guards to shuttle in his calls. His training techniques
were light-years ahead of his contemporaries, and his summer camps were laboratories
for experimentation that ultimately became NFL titles. For player safety, he invented the
facemask. Everything he did resulted in victories.”
As the scene turns to color shots following the recollection of Brown becoming
owner and coach of the Cincinnati Bengals, there is a cut to an interview with Hall of
Fame running back Jim Brown who says, “I was happy to play for Paul Brown because
Paul was very strict. He was the king. All you had to do was deal with him and if you
dealt with him successfully, then you didn’t have to worry about the other guys.” The
Brown clip then cuts to an interview with Hall of Fame running back Bobby Mitchell
saying “with myself, he would always say little things like, ‘maybe you’re not good
enough Bobby Mitchell—you keep hurting our football team.’ So then I’d go out there
and take it 60. The scene then shifts back to grainy footage of a Cleveland Browns back
running for a touchdown as the narrator remarks, “Brown was a demanding taskmaster,
who saw a multitude of sins not only in defeat but in victory.” The scene the returns to
the interview with Mitchell who says, “He’d come in and walk in front of the group, and
he’d say ‘we’ll go over what we did wrong in the game’—he’d take out this piece of
paper and it would drop all the way to the floor and I said, ‘gee we just beat these guys
38-0.’”
The scene then cuts to an interview with Hall of Fame quarterback Otto Graham.
Graham states, “Over the years, there were times that I loved him. There are times that I
hated him.” As the scene cuts to black and white footage of Brown in front of a
chalkboard lecturing players, Graham states, “But when I went into coaching myself, I
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found myself doing exactly the same things he used to do, saying some of the same
things he used to say.” The segment ends with Brown marching down the sideline of an
empty stadium, with Graham saying “playing for Paul Brown and the Cleveland Browns
was probably the best thing that ever happened to me.”
Chuck Knoll: Normalization Perfected
The scene on Chuck Knoll begins with a slow, upward pan on a still of Knoll
surrounded by four Super Bowl trophies. The narrator states, “Chuck Knoll won the most
Superbowls of any headcoach, but in his rookie year in 1969, he inherited one of the
worst franchises in NFL history. The Steelers were dubbed the lovable losers.” After a
grainy color close-up of Knoll, the scene cuts to an interview with linebacker Andy
Russell who says, “The first meeting with Chuck Knoll, we had a lot of cynical, old
veteran players, who’d seen a lot of coaches come and go and there was sort of this
attitude, ‘Show me your stuff coach.” As the segment cuts to footage of Knoll putting
players through practice drills, Russell says, “He gave a speech where he was essentially
saying, ‘Look, the reason you’ve been losing has nothing to do with your attitude. The
reason you’re losing is you’re not good enough. You can’t run fast enough, you’re not
quick enough. You’re not skilled enough…He said, “I’m gonna get rid of most of you,
I’m gonna bring in the guys who can play these defenses. They’re gonna be harder—I’m
gonna make you do the hard stuff.”
The segment then cuts to a close-up of a retired Knoll saying, “We say ‘whatever
it takes, and a lot of people have different meanings for that. But what it meant for us
was, as members of a team, you have to do whatever you can do to help the team win.”
The segment cuts to shots of various Steelers making violent tackles and difficult

71

receptions as Knoll says, “Now if someone else is not functioning very well, they may be
sick…someone else has to step up. ‘Whatever it takes’ means team, and I think our guys
bought into that.” The segment cuts to shots of the Steelers victory in Super Bowl IX as
they narrator states, “In Super Bowl IX, Knoll’s Steelers used defense and the running
game to defeat the Minnesota Vikings. It then cuts to shots of the Steelers’ two Super
Bowl victories over the Cowboys win and the Rams, where the narrator states “his
Steelers cemented their legacy as the team of the 70’s.” The scene ends with the Steelers’
huddled around Knoll as Andy Russell says, “Coach Knoll would always say, ‘If they’re
trying to fool you, that means they can’t beat you with their best stuff, they’re desperate.
Just line up and say, ‘Come on.’ That was Chuck Knoll.”
The process of normalization, as defined by Foucault, seeks to instill docility
through a micro-economy of penal mechanisms.
It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of following the overall
rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be
respected or as an optimum towards which one must move. It measures in
quantitative terms and hiearchizes in terms of value of the abilities, the level, the
‘nature’ of individuals. It introduces, through this ‘value-giving’ measure, the
constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that
will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of
the abnormal.123

The process of normalization can be seen in both the scenes on Brown and Knoll.
The narration in the scene on Brown practically reads as a tribute to normalization
techniques. The shots of Brown leading his players in callisthenic exercises and in
training camp demonstrate the quantitative systems of measurement (ultimately resultant
in “victories”) Brown created to establish the minimum threshold for acceptable
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performance as it concerned the body of each player. The narrator’s remark that Brown
was a “demanding taskmaster” who saw a “multitude of sins” in both wins and losses
seeks to frame Brown’s behavior and coaching technique in religious light—perhaps
unsurprising since it was religious orders who were the first to truly experiment with the
disciplinary techniques of supervision and management of time in relation to the bodily
subject.124 The narrative legitimizes Brown’s authority by linking it to older, presumably
more omniscient forms of the same disciplinary practice.
The interviews with Mitchell, Brown, and Graham provide the qualitative
evidence as to how these instruments of normalization are internalized by the object of
discipline—in this case the players. The remarks by Bobby Mitchell, whose recollection
of Brown saying he “was not good enough” and “hurting our football team” inspired him
to then make a big play demonstrates how creating limits of difference in performance
seek to reorient what the disciplinarian sees as inadequate measurements of value back
into the optimal level of docility or minimum threshold of acceptable performance. In
addition, his recollection of Brown pulling out a list of all the things the team “did
wrong” even in a decisive victory shows how specific and explicit the economy of
discipline is in terms of creating spaces that provide fixed positions and establish
operational links between the potentially disparate parts125 of a larger corporate body like
a team.
Furthermore, Jim Brown’s affirmation of Brown’s strictness and his
acknowledgment that the coach was “the king” illustrates how normalization reorients the

124

Ibid., 150.

125

Foucault, 148.

73

power relationship of the player-coach from one that could be adversarial to one that
makes the disciplinary object respect and assign a high political value to the
disciplinarian. The normalizing tactic of value assignment thus works to not only create a
system of differentiation which docilizes players but also instills obedience by allowing
players to assign higher values to those above them. Ultimately, these scenes assign a
moral authority to Brown that corresponds to paternalistic qualities embodied in the
pastoral tradition—analogous to what Lakoff refers to as the Strict-Father model of
morality. The ability of Brown to produce players through the construction of strict
normalization schemes demonstrates the notion inherent in the pastoral/Strict Father
mythology that the paternal figure must, through his authority, “create more selfdisciplined people.”126
This is best evidenced in the remarks by Graham when he states that, despite his
feelings of both love and hate for Brown, playing for him was “one of the best things that
ever happened” to him. Graham’s note that despite his conflicted feelings towards
Brown, when he entered Brown’s position he found himself doing many of the same
things, speaks to the ability of the disciplinary power to sustain itself by its own
mechanisms—constantly replicating itself without having to resort to more extreme
corporal forms of control. 127
Normalization is also the key point of emphasis for the scene on Knoll, albeit with
an even more specific fixation on the body as an object of discipline. This is first
evidenced by Russell’s recollection of Knoll’s first speech to the team, which emphasized
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that the team’s failure was not due to any deficiency in attitude but rather in the lack of
physical regimentation necessary to succeed. Seen this way, Knoll’s statements to his
team that they couldn’t run “fast enough,” were not “quick enough,” and not “skilled
enough” are examples of him establishing a measurable, minimal threshold of a player’s
value. Failure to live up to these standards would lead to penalization through
replacement—“getting rid of” those who are at the limits of abnormality in favor of those
who can “do the hard stuff.”
The end result of this process of normalization, as evidenced by Knoll’s own
comments, is a complete docilization of the player’s body into conformity with
hierarchical prerogatives, and the transformation of the body as an individual unit into a
mechanized part of a larger, almost industrial apparatus. Knoll’s statement that if
someone “is not functioning very well” or is “sick” that “someone else has to step up”
might as well have come from a factory manager or corporate manager. Indeed, this latter
point has been referred to as the “Taylorization” of the body, depictions of which are
rampant throughout commercial sport culture.128 These depictions not only reinforce the
hierarchy in the sport, but the industrial-administrative hierarchy that most of the viewers
are familiar with in reality.
It should not come as a surprise that, in distinction to the scenes on owners and
executives, which relied a good deal on close-ups of the subject (concurrent with an
authority derived from surveillance power), most of the imagery within the scenes on
head coaches maintains a focus on the actual game footage and the players’ bodies in
motion rather than on the coach himself. The point of emphasis of the coach’s authority
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within the game’s hierarchy is his ability to produce, through the process of
normalization, a “mechanics of power” which defines not only how one may have a hold
over others’ bodies, but also that they can operate how they wish, with the techniques,
speed and efficiency they determine. He increases the force of the body in terms of
economic utility while simultaneously diminishing the potential of these bodies to be
disobedient.129 He is the disciplinarian who in the most direct way operates on the bodies
which at once prop up the corporate apparatus of the League while also being a point of
potential resistance.
In the idealized depiction of the NFL, the power to discipline subordinate parts of
the game’s hierarchy is exercised through mechanisms of varying visibility and direct
action. The owner instills discipline through quiet surveillance of subordinate parts
around him. His apparent omnipresence molds behavior of subordinate actors by creating
senses of community that allow power to be seen in its face yet unseen in its effect. It is a
panoptic discipline.130 The executive instills discipline in much the same way—by
assuming responsibility for and becoming the de facto figurehead of the League, he is
creating an artificial person—not unlike the Hobbesian sovereign, who is respected for
his ability to defend the organization from internal and external threats to its integrity.131
In these latter cases, the instilling of discipline is achieved more or less through resigned
means. While the executive may have higher visibility than the owner, both employ a
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disciplinary power that is more passive in that it does not act directly on the physical
bodies of subordinates. By contrast, the scenes on Brown and Knoll make clear that the
head coach instills discipline on the bodies of the lowest subordinate part of the League—
the players, through slightly more direct processes of normalization.
Conclusion: Pastoralism as Constructed Necessity
During the pregame broadcast for Super Bowl XLIII, NBC and the NFL aired a
live interview with President Obama from the map room in the White House. The
President was dressed in a casual work-shirt and slacks. Most of the questions from
interviewer Matt Lauer revolved around the president’s family life and interest in sports,
yet a few dealt with issues of presumed substance. For example, in discussing the
president’s daily security briefings, Lauer asked, “There are tens of millions of people
watching this broadcast right now. If they were to have access to the same information
you have now on a daily basis, how much less sleep would we all be getting?” The
president responded by stating, “We’ve got real threats, and we need to remain vigilant,
but the quality of our armed forces has never been better. When you meet the people who
are charged with keeping America safe it gives you enormous confidence.”132
The interview is provocative as it concerns the construction of the pastoral ideal
in NFL videography not only because it shows an actual political interview taking place
in the broadcast space of the League’s biggest event (suggesting there is a deeper
relationship between the League and political institutions, a topic which will be explored
in the following chapter), but in how specifically the president is characterized. Using the
map room as a the setting for the interview, having the president dressed in casual attire,

132

Super Bowl XLIII Gameday (February 1, 2009). [Television Broadcast] New York: NBC.

77

and focusing primarily on the president as a father and husband frames the president as
the paternal figure of nostalgic lore while presenting him in way that is voyeuristically
accessible to the viewer’s frame of reference. Lauer’s question regarding the security
briefings reaffirms the necessity of the president having exclusivity to his power—for if
we all knew what he did we would be sleepless, much like a child who may worry about
monsters under the bed. The president’s ability to maintain vigilance and his confidence
in the hierarchy of people that keeps America safe projects the ability to cope with threats
that completes the pastoral figure’s importance in maintaining passivity amongst the
mass of citizens more generally.
The brief interview demonstrates how much of the pastoral politics found in NFLfilms material is easily visible and derived from the political world. In less than 11
minutes, the president is seen as having the paternal vigilance of the NFL patriarchs, the
ability to cope and project confidence like commissioners, as well as to normalize a
system of hierarchy which places confidence in leadership to protect against threats
which the public, in its child-like state (much like the players on a football team) cannot
know about. To paraphrase Bill Walsh, the political administrative apparatus, punctuated
with uncertainty and violence, is tamed by a sense of calmness and serenity which
removes the worst sides of people in favor of the whole.
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CHAPTER 3
BEYOND COUNTERSUBVERSION: OTHER LEAGUE STRATEGIES AND
CONTESTING FORCES
“In order to gain and to hold the esteem of men it is not sufficient merely to possess
wealth or power. The wealth or power must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded
only on evidence.”
—Thornstein Veblen133
“Arlington is nobody’s damn suburb”
— former Arlington, TX Mayor Richard Greene134

So far, this study has looked at the dissemination of elements of the
countersubversive tradition in NFL filmography and televised content. The reason for this
is, as stated before, the prominence of the League as a cultural icon in that medium, as
well as the small screen’s unique ability to penetrate individuals’ psyches both intimately
and repeatedly. This does not mean, however, that the propagation of countersubversive
belief and resultant policy that reflects elements of it are always directly relegated and the
resultant transmission of small screen imagery alone. Indeed, to delegate this function
exclusively to mass texts like film would mean that the producer of countersubversive
material would need to be certain that the viewers would absorb and accept without
hesitation the message the countersubversive wishes to convey, rather than create their
own counter-meanings. While, as mentioned, recitation of the message may mitigate this
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possibility, it is not a panacea. 135 Other strategies must be (and are) employed
simultaneously with transmission of video texts to reinforce beliefs “on the ground.”
Moreover, this study has only briefly touched on the actual policy incentives that
induce entities like the NFL to encode countersubversive belief into their cultural texts.
For a league that Michael Oriard has noted publicly disavows making political
statements,136 this study suggests there are in fact many political messages being
encapsulated in NFL programming. Thus one would expect to find some suggestion of
actual policy inducements and political contestation of policies which entice the League
to engage in propagation of countersubversive messages in its product that benefits the
League’s bottom line as a corporate institution. This chapter examines both the question
of additional strategies that work with countersubversive propagation and the policy
inducements which make it practical for the League to employ them through the issues of
public financing of football stadiums and labor struggles. In examining these topics, I
hope to show how other strategies and contested politics help shape the League’s
propagandistic response to a much more complicated political world.
Stadium Politics
In its 2008 season “Kickoff” literature, the League boldly claims that the
construction and renovation of football stadiums is a positive boon to communities
because, aside from economic benefits of job creation through the stadium itself and
“satellite” businesses, new stadiums “become hubs of community activity and sources of
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civic pride” for those cities who house them137. Such hyperbole from the League’s most
unadulterated propaganda, however attractive to a fan or marketing student, masks the
real story of the NFL’s political economy, one that relies heavily on the upward
redistribution of public revenue to extremely wealthy team owners as well as “satellite”
coalitions of corporations and public representatives that support them. Yet the story
behind stadium pushes by the League and its corporate-government sponsors is in many
ways an outcome to a larger story of highly collectivistic internal economic arrangements
which have been the driving impetus behind the League’s popularity and conflicts over
status that this success has wrought.
As Mark Yost notes in his study of the League’s economic success, from its
earliest days, the NFL has utilized a system of managed cooperation where both revenue
(brought in largely through ever-growing television contracts as well as merchandising
agreements and ticket sales) and talent (through the NFL Draft and a strict salary cap) are
shared equally throughout the teams so that, “by operating in a quasisocialistic system,
the NFL guarantees fans the high-caliber competition that has kept stadium seats filled
and television viewers enthralled.”138 As Yost notes, while these touted agreements have
created the competitive parity or “Any Given Sunday” appeal that has allowed the
League to thrive, they have also been a point of contention between larger market
“entrepreneurial” owners and small market owners largely due to the one unshared
revenue source for teams—stadium revenue, which now accounts for slightly over 25
percent of a team’s annual profit.139 Yet while smaller market owners grouse about the
137
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larger market owners stadium revenues threatening the “level playing field” of the game
and its status within the American sports community, the actual substance of stadium
debate suggests that it is a conflict over profit numbers and interclass standing rather than
actual competitiveness that creates friction within the NFL’s Fortune 500-type ownership
class.140
Again going to Yost’s study, the author notes that the biggest discrepancy and
point of contention between the NFL owners is not actual stadium seating capacity for the
average ticketholder but rather “premium seating”—box seats, private suites, private
stadium clubs and personal seat licenses which contributes greatly to a team’s overall
profitability —and hence stature and wealth of an owner relative to his colleagues in the
League and in boardrooms elsewhere. This point is illustrated by Yost’s descriptions of
the activity that occurs at luxury suites on game days at these often publicly subsidized
stadiums.
Frequent guests in [Redskins’ owner] Snyder’s owner’s box include
former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and his wife, NBC
news correspondent Andrea Mitchell, [former and late] congressman and
NFL quarterback Jack Kemp, and other Washington power players. In
Charlotte, bankers rather than politicians hobnob on the club level of Bank
of America Stadium before Carolina Panthers’ games. At Denver’s
Invesco Field at Mile High, oil, gas, and real estate executives gather
before Broncos games in the club level sponsored by United Airlines.141

From Yost’s description it appears that insofar as stadiums serve as places of
community and civic pride, the community being talked about is not the public at large
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but in fact the corporate-political community of a given city. Sociologists Kevin Delany
and Rick Eckstein argue that it is precisely the need to draw new executive talent into the
corporate community that makes local corporate growth coalitions partner with, if not
take the lead in, promoting public stadium subsidies for team owners. As one executive in
their study commented, new stadiums (and their luxury boxes) are the sort of amenity
that corporations need to draw the “A players” to their midsized cities.142 In essence, the
attraction of public underwriting of stadiums is to give team owners and corporate elites
in cities “something to show off.”143
The analyses put forth by Yost, Delaney, and Eckstein suggest that the impetus
for stadium construction in the NFL comes not from the need to increase team profit for
on-the-field competitive capacity but rather to increase profit for the sake of cultivating
an image of powerful accumulative capability within the class station of owners and their
corporate peers. As Delaney and Eckstein note, many of the “postindustrial” cities where
stadium pushes from owners and corporate growth coalitions have occurred are based on
the perception held by the local growth coalitions that their cities “radiate a negative
impression to the surrounding world” and that the flurry of new stadium construction
gives corporate executives looking to impress other high level executive talent the
impression that their location is a “city on the move.”144 That it is widely accepted by
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corporate elites that these types of projects have little public net economic benefit145 is all
the more important because as theorist Thornstein Veblen observed, in order for
conspicuous expenditure to be reputable, it must be an expenditure on superfluities that is
ultimately wasteful. No merit would accrue from the consumption of the bare necessities
of life [including, perhaps, education, mass transit, and affordable housing] except by
comparison with the abjectly poor who are not, under the pecuniary standard, worthy of
invidious comparison.146 Executives who pride themselves on being touted as civic actors
want “visible monuments to their efforts.” It is far more appreciable to a corporate
director to push to build a stadium than to try to improve inner-city test scores, especially
when the new stadium could be named after their company.147
Of course, simply desiring to create points of invidious comparison among an
elite social grouping does not translate into a political consensus that such ideas are
worthy of public expenditure. Essentially, owners and corporate backers of publicly
subsidized stadiums must create an atmosphere of opinion that ties the stadium to an
idealized depiction of the community versus its real self and its neighbors. And indeed, as
Delaney and Eckstein’s work shows, it is precisely this strategy, what they call “the
manipulation of community self esteem and community collective conscience” that has
been the modus operandi for stadiums backers for most of the latter decade.148
Those attempting to manipulate internal community self-esteem usually warn
local residents about the dangers of slipping to the depths of some nearby city,
which has been socially constructed as inferior. A community’s decline to minor
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league status, they argue, will surely be exacerbated by not building a new
stadium, which would precipitate a team’s decision to leave the city. So in
Cleveland we kept hearing that having professional sports (especially in new
stadiums) would keep the city from becoming another Akron. In Cincinnati, the
presence of professional sports would prevent the city from turning into
Louisville. Stadium proponents in Minneapolis and Denver did not want to
become colder versions of Omaha.149

Corporate growth coalitions take ideals of invidious comparison and transpose
them on to the entire communities in which they operate, creating a sense that it is the
sports teams’ presence which constitutes the social glue of the community. As journalists
Neil DeMause and Joanna Cagan point out in their stadium study, Field of Schemes, for
generations, “the special emotional presence of the local team has been played up—by
sports promoters, by the local media, by fans themselves. These are the home teams:
unique, regional representations of a city’s heart and soul.”150 Backers of stadiums and
related projects go so far with this idea as to include nostalgic aspects of a city’s
particular historical character into the designs of new projects, reinventing the modern
mall experience into a genuine walk down memory lane.151 That these projects often wipe
out the actual remnants of what was left of the city’s history, and that these new stadiums,
purported to have the capacity to obliterate class differences, are largely attractive due to
their luxury suites152 becomes an afterthought, building the stadium to keep the team
becomes the point of departure for even more conspicuous consumption at public cost.153
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Owners and growth coalitions are aided in their stadium subsidy plans by
politicians who are eager to enhance their image among groups of constituents.
Exemplary of this notion is former Ohio Hamilton County commissioner Bob
Bedinghaus, discussed by Delaney and Eckstein in their study of the successful football
stadium effort in Cincinnati. A self-styled “no new taxes” Republican, in 1996 he became
the spokesperson for a half-percent county sales tax increase to fund construction of a
new stadium for the Bengals. Under the agreement, which passed by a county-wide
margin of 61 percent (though support was significantly lower in urban Cincinnati proper),
the city would construct the $270 million stadium and pay for operations with the
Bengals receiving all revenues while paying a mere rent of $1.1 million for nine years
after which it would be dropped to nothing.154 Moreover, a 3 percent ticket tax proposal
that was meant to allocate money to the city’s crumbling public school system was
quickly dropped as Bengals’s ownership argued it would hamper the team’s ability to be
competitive. As the project got underway and costs ballooned to over $400 million,
Bedinghaus saw his popularity fade and subsequently lost his reelection bid, despite
receiving over $144,000 from growth coalition leader and mogul Carl Linder (owner of
the Reds, American-Financial Group, Chiquita, Stokely-Van Camp and Financial World).
For his part, Bedinghaus remained defiant against criticisms that he had sold the county
and city out, claiming “the people of southwestern Ohio would ‘feel good’ about these
ballparks after the hoopla over money died down.” Bengals owner Mike Brown
compared him to Winston Churchill, who lost his election after winning a World War. 155
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The Cincinnati case illustrates the role public political actors play in the policy
process of publicly subsidized stadiums. They are, as Delaney and Eckstein state, the
public persona of a corporate community that may otherwise choose to remain covert in
their machinations to raise the level of superfluous spending in a given city.156 In the case
of Bob Bedinghaus, the folksy narrative of a conservative politician sitting down at his
kitchen table to work out a stadium funding plan was a mask for the true crafting of the
regressive tax by six businessmen and a consultant brought in from outside the city.157
The reason for putting the politician out in front of a stadium effort has to do with what
Edelman calls the preservation of the myth of popular and legislative supremacy. The
high school civics version of American government which argues that there is a
continuous, mechanical line of influence from ‘the people’ to administration and that
policy reflects popular will is such a strong symbol that it is scarcely challenged.158 Thus,
putting the face of the popular will on a plan gives it a sort of trust that may otherwise be
lacking.
This is not to say that politicians who support these stadium subsidy efforts are
inherently corrupt or view themselves simply as corporate mouthpieces (campaign
contributions and access to luxury boxes following the completion of these stadiums
notwithstanding), but rather that they face both ideological and electoral pressures that
make them more often than not willing to support pro-stadium forces by default.
Ideologically, like most citizens, politicians tend to grant more legitimacy to powerful
people or experts. Operating within institutional political structures which grant more
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legitimacy to powerful individuals, stadium backers rarely have to “fight city hall”
because political elites have been conditioned to accept by default that new stadiums
bring economic growth or heightened community self-esteem.159 Moreover, population
flight from cities has made suburban areas grow considerably more powerful in political
strength. As the suburbs grow, quality-of-life issues important to city residents become
underfunded as pressure is put on politicians to provide entertainment and other
diversions for suburbanites. This shift puts cities (and thus city and county politicians) in
a bind of having to attract both tourists and suburbanites and their money to maintain
upkeep of these projects as well as other urban priorities.160 DeMause and Cagan point
out this phenomenon more starkly in an interview with New York City planner Lukas
Herbert, who compares the Jets’ unsuccessful Manhattan-area stadium bid with the
ultimately successful stadium bid of the Yankees in the Bronx.
“There’s clearly a double standard here, says Herbert, noting that council
member Christine Quinn, who was at the forefront of the campaign to stop
the Jets’ stadium in her Manhattan district, pushed for quick approval of
the Yankees’ and Mets’ plans once she was elected council speaker.
Herbert concludes: “Stadiums are bad in middle-class or upper middleclass white neighborhoods, but they’re wonderful in black or Hispanic
neighborhoods where everyone is poor. There are a lot of middle class
people that live in this neighborhood, but there’s also a lot of poor people
here. And we were just told to shut up and take the project because it is
good for us.”161

Politicians are thus bound, not only by the pro-subsidy mentality of team owners
and corporate growth coalitions, but also by their own internalization of the value of
invidious comparison as a policy motivator. In addition, the external suburban desire to
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increase consumption and leisure time forces politicians to back wasteful activities in
order to maintain electoral support even if it means slashing funding for more
economically productive activities in the urban center. The poor and urban residents,
lacking the ability to compete with middle and upper classes in political power, are thus
saddled with these expenditures, often accepting them on the grounds that they will
provide some marginal economic benefit or at least restore aesthetic pride to the city.162
All of these issues revolving around conspicuous consumption including growth coalition
pressure, suburban vs. urban politics and class differentiation would come up again in
other cases, though perhaps no more noticeably in recent years than in the push by
Cowboys owner Jerry Jones to get a new stadium built in the greater Dallas area.
The Cowboys and Arlington: the Public Financing of Jerry World
While the story of the $1.5 billion Cowboys Stadium could be said to begin
officially in 2004 when a group of local Arlington businessmen and politicians started the
“Touchdown Arlington!” campaign to win public support for a sales tax increase to
procure some $325 million (and climbing) in funds for a new stadium to lure the
Cowboys to the city, the issue of subsidizing what is considered to be the most
impressive structure ever built for an NFL team actually began in earnest with the
purchase of the team by oil mogul Jerry Jones in 1989. Jones became one of the early
“entrepreneurial owners” in the League—looking to extract revenue from sources that
other teams were not exploiting. Jones found most of his opportunities in stadium
revenue opportunities—selling naming and concession rights to corporations such as
162
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Pepsi, Nike, and American Express. However, Jones’ crowning achievement at the time,
as Oriard notes, was turning Texas Stadium into “a playground for wealthy Texans,” by
doubling the price of tickets, replacing 2,500 ordinary seats with 100 more luxury suites
(on top of the present 289), and instituting seat licenses of up to $15,000 some of them
for season tickets held by former Cowboy players and employees.”163 Despite drawing a
verbal rebuke from the League for violating the previously discussed norms of
cooperation that had defined League business, Jones remained unrepentant, arguing that
the best commercial deals would go to those who “aggressively” pursued them.164
The actions taken by Jones seem to represent the previously discussed valuation
of public subsidizing of private stadiums in that they depict Jones as the quintessential
man of leisure who spends, not only for higher efficiency and comfort in his enterprise
and well being, but also because such expenditure is evidence of wealth and is thus
honorific in his social group. Under the influence of the belief of invidious comparison,
collective rebukes can be ignored because it is understood that whatever might be said
rhetorically, failure to spend in due quantity would become a mark of deformity and
demerit.165 The growth of this “punctilious discrimination” transforms the man of leisure
into a “connoisseur incredible viands of merit” in things considered “manly and
seemly”.166 In Jones’ case, his success in stadium revenue pushing has made him the
most admired connoisseur of how to extract public money for new private stadiums.
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The Cowboys Stadium deal with the city of Arlington came after a decade of
starts-and-fits to get a new stadium built in Irving, Texas (the now former and longtime
home of the team) or in Dallas proper. Irving became an unlikely prospect for a
rebuilding, given anti-tax sentiment among the older population there (in 1996 the city
voted to drop out of the mass transit system, which was looking for a 1 percent sales tax
increase to maintain operations167). With Irving out of the picture, Jones focused on
returning the team to the Fair Park area of Dallas, with a new stadium being the
centerpiece of a larger urban redevelopment scheme. Letters and editorials in The Dallas
Morning News attempted to appeal to economic arguments as well community selfesteem and consciousness in order to mobilize people behind the effort. The paper itself
argued that the stadium was a “unique opportunity to use the stadium as an economic
magnet to spur development.”168 More impassioned pleas for support came from more or
less anonymous citizens who attempted to link, not only the Cowboys, but football itself
to the city’s larger historical identity. In one letter, “a lifelong fan” appealed to the Dallas
officials to “rescue” a rare opportunity to restore the city’s heritage.
Football has differentiated this city from other places as a source of civic
pride, competitive energy and fun for decades. The great collegiate
association, the Southwest Conference, held its first organizational
meeting in 1914 at Dallas' Oriental Hotel. The UT-OU tradition started at
Fair Park in 1929. SMU had a dominating team in the 1930s and 1940s,
cresting during the Doak Walker era. The Cotton Bowl Classic was one of
the premiere college bowl games, hosting national championship teams
through the years. And, most notably, the Dallas Cowboys are America's
team. That heritage has been fading for 25 years. Moving the Cowboys
back to Fair Park would bring in playoff games, reinvigorate the Cotton
Bowl Classic, save the UT-OU game, attract the Super Bowl to town and
restore the mystical connection between Dallas and the Cowboys.
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Building the new stadium in Arlington destroys those traditions for the
city and weakens the Cowboys as well.169

This letter is of particular importance for two reasons. First, it demonstrates how
invidious comparison with surrounding cities leads to the perception that a city is
radiating a negative impression which can only be alleviated through public conspicuous
consumption on private stadiums. Football is what has “differentiated” the city from the
surrounding area and is distinct from “other sources of civic pride.” These statements
demonstrate the second and perhaps most important analytical aspect of the letter in that
they show how an artifact of popular culture is conceived of as a constitutive historic
element of a city’s identity. If the goal of the countersubversive in film is to use that
medium to create a sense of “the real” in accordance with countersubversive goals, it is
no less true in mobilizing political support in other settings and texts. The feigned
historiography becomes the basis of judgment on policy issues rather than objective facts
and costs.
Despite the impassioned pleas like the one examined above, Dallas rejected
Jones’ plans, with then-mayor Laura Miller arguing that paying an estimated $350
million in construction costs was not worth the pricetag compared to other priorities like
revitalizing downtown Dallas. And while Jones and other pro-stadium forces ridiculed
Miller, she remained defiant, saying, “Dallas didn’t fumble. Dallas just didn’t want to
play ball.”170 Miller’s vocal rebuke illustrates one of the key areas for contestation of
League prerogative—namely the availability of other images and myths to counteract the
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frame of reality put forth by the League’s countersubversive propaganda. As Delaney and
Eckstein note, major urban areas like San Diego, with shared cultural histories and
images that are independent of sports, can often fend off or at least drive harder bargains
with owners and growth coalitions because they can appeal to other aspects of the city’s
history as evidence of the city’s importance. They have more ways in which to limit
invidious comparison than simply tax-payer backed playgrounds for owners and their
corporate friends.171
Nevertheless, if Jones was met with resistance by Irving and Dallas, he had little
issue when it came to finding willing participants for his project in Arlington, Texas.
When Dallas couldn’t reach an agreement with Jones, a Cincinnati-style growth coalition
was waiting with open arms to aid Jones in the construction of his new home. As Dallas
Morning News reporter Jeff Mosier notes, “Touchdown Arlington!” was led by city
council member Robert Rivera, himself a former Chairman of the Arlington Convention
and Visitors Bureau, and the coalition was comprised of the usual suspects of civic and
business leaders, including Rusty Hancock of Martex Software and Rico Brown, former
Chairman of the African-American Chamber of Commerce.172 Playing the part of Bob
Bedinghaus was first-term conservative mayor Robert Cluck, who was said to have
contacted Jones first about the possibility of moving to the city, although other news
accounts say the Cowboys were considering about nine to ten locations, including
Arlington, before Cluck purportedly contacted the team.173
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While Mosier, who covered the stadium story from its beginning, argues that
the campaign itself was aimed largely at extolling the virtues of economic development
such a stadium would bring, he also acknowledges that the city has always had identity
issues relative to its neighbors in the greater Dallas area.
For a long time, Arlington officials have tried to carve out their own
identity separate from Dallas and Fort Worth. There have been attempts to
add an "A" into the DFW moniker that refers to this area…former
Arlington Mayor Richard Greene had a frequent line about this:
"Arlington is no one's damn suburb… it's been an underlying current for
years. Arlington has a larger population than Cincinnati and Pittsburgh,
but it's still thought of as just another suburb.174
Mosier’s assessment of Arlington’s identity politics is exemplary of the
invidious comparison and inferiority complexes that Delaney and Eckstein argue are keys
to the ability of growth coalitions to manipulate community consciousness and selfesteem into financing stadium projects. Still, as Mosier notes, despite (or because of) its
inferiority complex, Arlington was already a major tourist destination, home to the Texas
Rangers and their publicly-financed park, as well as Six Flags over Texas and the
Hurricane Harbor water park.175 As noted before, when a city already has “cultural
perks,”176 it can be difficult to exploit community consciousness without also tying it to
economic development. This was the course pursued by the “Touchdown Arlington!”
Campaign.
The mailers for the pro-stadium campaign reflected this. The first mailing
included pro-stadium quotes from various former county and city officials touting the
economic and community self-esteem benefits. In between quotes about “fiscal
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responsibility” and the need to “invest” in a high-crime area177 were pictures of the
Cowboys’ Super Bowl trophies, men working in hard hats, and children playing soccer
with a cut-out of a giant potted flower underneath pasted on the photo. The literal
centerpiece of the mailing is three connected footballs, respectively reading “2,000 new
jobs, $2.9 city revenues, and $238 million economic impact.” 178The second mailer opens
with the message” On November 2, Arlington Voters can Improve a High Crime Area…”
followed by an image of police tape stating “Crime Scene Do Not Cross.” The next page
shows pictures of children playing as well as parents and families enjoying outdoor
sports. Alongside the photos are the identical talking points from the first mailer with one
noticeable addition—a specific point saying to vote yes in order to “Reduce Crime and
Protect Families.” The talking point goes on to say that “With Dallas Cowboys Stadium
and the Cowboys Hall of Fame Museum, we can take a neighborhood suffering from one
of the highest crime rates in Arlington and turn it into a safe attraction for tourists and
visitors coming for concerts, family entertainment, and major events like the Super Bowl
which brought $330 million to Houston.” The mailer ends with the statement “Vote Yes
on November 2. Let’s Win for Our Economy and Quality of Life.”179
The mailers are instructive in that they demonstrate how the elements discussed
previously: manipulation of community-self esteem and socioeconomic bias in prostadium politics are used, often in tandem with elements of the countersubversive in order

177

Mosier notes that crime reduction was a large centerpiece of the economic-civic argument for the
stadium, though he called the statistics used to justify the claims exaggerated. FBI Statistics show that the
city had its biggest drop in the crime rate in nearly 7 years in 2003, a year before the stadium project was
put on the public agenda. See Fort Worth Star Telegram, June 17, 2003.
178

“Touchdown Arlington!” Mailer 1.

179

“Touchdown Arlington!” Mailer 2.

95

to rearrange local loyalties to fit the League and its corporate partners’ agenda. The
images of construction workers, children and families evoke the paternalistic nostalgia
that recalls a protective and safe world that is achieved only through the remolding of the
frontier, in this case by the construction of a stadium. They are juxtaposed against the
image, symbolized by the police tape, of the omnipresent specter of subversion through
the criminal element. The images provide a contrast for the desired (paternal protection)
versus the purported reality (crime).The presented solution to this threat is public
expenditure in order to entice the wealthier dwellers on the periphery to enter the city and
spend their leisure time and money there in order to boost economic conditions and wipe
out the criminal demon. That Jerry Jones himself may profit by as much as $735 million
from his public-private investment is curiously not called theft.180
On October 13, 2000, NBC broadcast the first regular season game from
Cowboys Stadium on “Sunday Night Football.” While the stadium had been open nearly
all summer, this was its official debut on the televised stage, and the broadcast—both pregame and the game itself, came off as more of an infomercial for the stadium and Jerry
Jones rather than a focused analysis on the game itself. Pre-game show host Bob Costas
referred to the stadium as “the Palace in Dallas.” Al Michaels (an outspoken conservative
broadcaster) said he’d “never been anywhere else in the world like it.” In fact Michaels
praised Jones’ courage for continuing on with the project in spite of the economic
downturn, perhaps unaware that Jones was not footing a significant portion of the bill for
his new home. Interviewing Jones right before kickoff, Costas did note potential issues
180
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faced by Jones and his cohorts regarding labor disputes and a potential change in revenue
structure. In a particularly Reagnesque answer, Jones said it was his job to “grow the pie”
so that players could concentrate on playing while owners concentrated on “building
more stadiums.”181
The opening to the actual game broadcast started off with successive shots of the
pyramids, Parthenon, Great Wall of China, Taj Mahal, and the Coliseum. With
triumphant horns playing in the background, a voice says, “The man-made wonders of
the world, and now Cowboys Stadium.” Al Michaels then states, “What the Roman
Coliseum was to the first century, Cowboys Stadium is to the 21st Century. Welcome to
Jerry World—a sports and entertainment complex that has raised the bar to an entirely
new level.” Analyst Chris Collinsworth called the stadium, “simply the best.” Shots of
Rudolph Giuliani in Jones’ owner’s box were shown interwoven with shots of Texas
armed forces members waving a field-long U.S. flag during the national anthem. The
ceremonial coin toss was performed by former President George W. Bush, the last man to
bilk Arlington out of public money for the Rangers’ ballpark nearly two decades ago.
Nearly every commercial break in the game started with a shot of Jones conversing with
Bush, Giuliani and other people of historical importance to the Cowboys’ organization as
well as the average fans whose seats surround the owner’s box with an almost panoptic
quality. Not once during the broadcast was it mentioned that “Jerry World” had been
built partially with public funds or that it was facing numerous cost overruns that would
hurt the city which had financed it.182 Rather, the focus was on the building as a
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representation of a particular man (Jones) and his pecuniary tastes and beliefs in
corporate capitalism as evidenced by the neoliberal political company around him. That
the political figures are presented as supplicants to Jones’ hospitality not only speaks to
the previously mentioned concept that the man of leisure is looking for witnesses to his
excess, but also demonstrates how the League and the networks who broadcast games
celebrate and normalize the pecuniary reputability of Jones under what Veblen calls “the
propaganda of culture.”
The propaganda of culture is in great part an inculcation of new tastes, or rather a
new schedule of proprieties, which have been adapted to the upper class scheme
of life under the guidance of the leisure-class formulation of status and pecuniary
decency. This new schedule of proprieties is intruded into the lower-class scheme
of life from the code elaborated by an element of the population whose life lies
outside of the industrial process…the economic reform wrought [from changes in
the propaganda of culture] is largely of the nature of a permutation in the methods
of conspicuous waste.183

Evidence of the propaganda of culture is seen in “Sunday Night Football” not
only through the presentation of Jones as an archetypal man of leisure but also through
the presentation of the building itself. Whereas monuments like the Taj Mahal and Great
Wall are shown as “first century” relics, predicated on religious or defensive power,
Cowboys’ Stadium is the embodiment of the proprieties of the 21st century—surveillance
(as evidenced by the owner’s box being situated in between standard fan seats),
neoliberalism (as evidenced by the fixation on the presence of Bush and Giuliani), and
imperial nationalism, as evidenced by the massive flag and military participation in the
event’s opening.
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The stadium issue demonstrates not only the real policy inducements (public
money for private enterprise) that motivate the League but also one point of contestation
the League is up against. As the case of Dallas rejecting a homecoming for the Cowboys
shows, even in a political reality which generally is supportive of League and corporate
prerogatives, political actors can rely on other sources of political or social capital to
defeat these prerogatives. Nowhere has this been historically more evident than with the
relationship between the League and its players’ union.
Labor Battles Then and Now
While the cultural politics of urban areas have at times been an important
counterpoint to NFL prerogatives and a rebuke of NFL propaganda, they in many ways
pale in comparison to the historical contestation put forth by the players’ themselves in
the form of labor disputes that first centered around gaining the right to organize and are
now focused on being able to protect and expand on the labor freedoms that the League
often reluctantly granted because of those struggles.
In Brand NFL, Michael Oriard provides arguably the most complete history of the
drive to organize the players into a legitimate union—a struggle which would last nearly
three decades, would create multiple work stoppages, and would ultimately be decided by
federal courts rather than picket lines. In fact, the NFL Players’ Association (NFLPA)
was in many ways the result of a Supreme Court case—Radovich v. NFL (1957) which,
at the time, subjected the NFL to anti-trust law (a move which, as previously noted, was
later nullified by the Kennedy Administration and Congress). Conservative leadership
relegated the union to little more than a grievance committee rather than a genuine
collective bargaining unit, but nonetheless gave players some tangible benefits including
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a minimum salary and injury compensation. More importantly, it set the foundation for
future labor challenges by slightly more progressive union leaders.184
The first large-scale, player-driven drive for labor freedom in the NFL began with
the 1974 strike, which occurred just three years after the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) recognized the NFLPA as a legitimate collective bargaining unit. The initial
contract issues centered around a list of 63 demands which dealt nominally with salary
increases and the impact of Astroturf on players’ safety, but were, as Oriard notes, most
specifically geared at attacking what the players saw as issues of basic freedom in regard
to treatment by management and coaches as it concerned curfews, fines and most
importantly, the right to free agency.
The ‘anarchic’ freedoms demanded in 1974 are the basic rights enjoyed by every
player in the NFL today, but the strike of 1974 marked the beginning of a slowmotion revolution that took two decades to play out. The modern NFL was built
on two fundamental ‘anti-freedoms’: the players’ lack of freedom to move from
team to team and the owners’ lack of freedom to move from city to city. The
Oakland Raider’s Al Davis would win freedom for owners in a three-year legal
battle with the NFL in the early 1980s…the players would not win theirs until
1993.185

The strike, which would begin in July of 1974 with a public picket in San Diego
where players sported signs with radical slogans like, “Monopoly is Played with Dice”
and, “People are Players, not Property,” ended by September with the union defeated
both through a lack of solidarity among star players and other veterans as well as a
concerted propaganda push by the owners, represented through a Management Council,
to portray the players as greedy and ignorant of economic facts regarding the League’s
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operations. Interestingly, Oriard imputes a great deal of the failure of the 1974 strike to
the media in NFL team towns, who stressed the “rugged individualism” of American life
over “the social compact” ideal of the team sport and portrayed NFL teams as
“Darwinian Jungles” rather than families.186 The strike also showed the more repressive
side of the NFL, as clubs cut most of the players associated with the union, including
future coaching legend Bill Curry.187
Players made a second push for labor freedom in 1982, just as the NFL was
reaching the beginning of its pinnacle as America’s favorite sport. It was preceded by a
landmark NLRB ruling that the NFL had engaged in unfair labor practices during the
1974 strike and court decisions which found basic tenets of the NFL’s economic
system—the college draft and restricted free agency, in violation of antitrust law unless
they were agreed to under collective bargaining. 188 Presumably armed with the law
behind them, players and their union leader Ed Garvey struck during the regular season in
1982 (another first) in order to push forward a management model for the League that
made the NFLPA a full partner in the management and operation of the NFL. Owners,
unwilling to cede operational control of the League to any degree, cancelled the season.
As with the previous strike, a lack of labor solidarity between star players such as Joe
Montana and Terry Bradshaw also contributed greatly to any effective public
mobilization for a labor action.189 The strike failed, but legal victories and increases in
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player salaries (driven in part by competition from the now-defunct USFL) made free
agency a real possibility for future negotiations.
The final and most successful drive for labor freedom began in 1987 when new
NFLPA head Gene Upshaw called for a regular season strike with free agency as a
primary demand. The 24-day strike ended up far more successfully than the previous
ones for a couple of reasons: first, labor solidarity was higher as even high profile players
such as Jim Kelly and John Elway sat out the start of the season (though the NFL’s
biggest star, Joe Montana, again did not). Secondly, in contrast to their actions in the last
strike, NFL’s owners decided to play the season anyway with scab or “replacement”
players—a move which turned fans and the press decidedly against the League. As
Oriard notes, the general attitude in 1987 “seemed to be that owners were doing what
owners do: make lots of money, bust unions, and profess concern for ‘the integrity of the
game’ while dumping a fraudulent version of the NFL on a gullible public.” Still, with a
television monopoly on pro football broadcasts at the time, scab games delivered enough
ratings that the strike itself was fruitless in terms of immediate gains.190 However, it did
give the union enough time to file labor suits against the NFL entitled Powell v. NFL and
McNeil v. NFL. Victory in the latter case (and the temporary decertifying of the union as
a bargaining agent) would force the NFL into a managed partnership with the NFLPA
that was ratified in 1993. The deal guaranteed free agency as well as a percentage of
television revenue sharing for players, and saw the League achieve its longest labor peace
since the 1950s.
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The Current Controversies
With the current collective bargaining agreement that has given the NFL its labor
peace and commercial longevity set to expire with the 2011 season, a new activism has
emerged among the NFLPA and its players both in terms of expanding labor freedom and
creating greater transparency in the conducting of League financial affairs. It began in
earnest with the passing of former longtime NFLPA director Gene Upshaw in 2008 and
the subsequent appointment of DeMaurice Smith, a corporate attorney and political ally
of President Obama191 in March 2009. What makes Smith’s appointment particularly
interesting is that he is the first NFLPA Executive Director to have no previous ties to the
NFL in a coaching, management, union, or player capacity. The appointment, which
came as surprise to analysts, may be in part due to the issues surrounding the next
bargaining agreement, which present one of the biggest challenges to the League’s
financial operations to date as it concerns transparency and revenue sharing.
In July 2009, Smith and a handful of NFL player representatives met with liberal
Democratic leadership in Congress in a push to lobby lawmakers to reconsider the
League’s anti-trust exemption status as well as its bookkeeping practices. The push came
after a League Management Council proposal (made public by the union) demanded that
players accept a 20 percent football revenue sharing reduction in the next collective
bargaining agreement. 192The League claimed such a reduction is necessary to offset
losses in profit, a claim the union and others find dubious given the League’s continued
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boost in ratings.193 Moreover, a union commissioned study found that the average value
of the teams has grown from $288 million to $1.04 billion over 10 years, an increase of
about 14 percent a year, severely undermining the League’s claims and providing the
basis for a legal reconsideration of the League’s accounting practices and anti-trust
protections194.
Other indicators that the NFLPA intends to take a more militant line include the
shoring up of star power behind union prerogatives, with marquee quarterbacks Tom
Brady and Drew Brees both becoming player representatives in 2009. Such an early
commitment of solidarity provides a marked contrast to what reporter Ron Borges calls
the “shameful” practice of star players of previous eras snubbing union efforts.195 Still the
largest signs that the players’ are willing to take a prolonged stand on the revenue pay cut
come from the militant tone of Smith himself, who has called the upcoming fight “a
battle of owners against players, and, I believe, against fans.”
When you negotiate with the networks, when the owners get the monies from the
networks even if the games aren't played, is it really a battle of billionaires against
millionaires? Or is it a battle between owners on one side and the people who play
and the people who watch…our fans identify with that. They understand punching
a clock every day. My hope is that sooner rather than later we get to the point
where we can jointly announce at least to our fans that the one thing we don't
have to worry about is football going away.''196

By framing the issue in populist rhetoric, Smith is clearly trying to position the
CBA negotiations as a progressive fight for the preservation of not only the game but the
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blue collar mentality that surrounds it. In doing so, he, and the players he speaks for, look
less like cattle in the pastoral pens the League likes to display in its propaganda and more
like human beings, a significant challenge to the League’s self-image and policy agenda.
Conclusion: When Countersubversion Meets Political Reality
Writing about the larger historical and political impact of Birth of a Nation, Rogin
argues that the film’s ultimate success as a political document rested in its ability to tap
collective fantasies that created a “conviction of truth beyond history.” In a political
world shaped by contingencies and conflicting interpretations, the aim of D.W. Griffith’s
work was to “abolish interpretation” and to make the film not merely “an avenue to
history but its replacement.”197
The NFL, through the countersubversive discourse in its filmography, particularly
its emphasis on militarized unity and a pastoral organizational structure, attempts to do
what Griffith sought out to do a century ago—put a utopian gloss over a political world
(and sport) where interpretations of events are not necessarily linear. The
countersubversive practitioner is attempting to replace a world where other shared
cultural dynamics (in the case of stadiums, community identities, and in the case of
players, their roles as laborers under a restrictive system) may undermine the policy
agenda the League desires. From the cases studied here, it appears that insofar as the
League is successful, it is only when there is a lack of shared cultural identity (as with
stadium construction) or relative peace in its relations to its players, which is now
eroding. At the same time, the success of contesting forces will likely also depend on
whether their capacity to mobilize their interpretations (e.g. billionaire owners vs. fans)

197

Rogin, 228.

105

of events is captivating enough to convince others that the NFL utopia is unworthy of
their support. How these issues will continue to play out will likely have as much or more
to do with external forces (economic recession, infrastructure decay, etc.) than any of the
participants may realize.
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CONCLUSION
THE NFL, PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL TRADITION
“Practices attributed to the subversive actually depict countersubversive aspirations; the
more powerful the demonology, therefore, the more it speaks, against itself, truths about
American politics.” - Michael Rogin198
“They are the ones with prejudice and bigotry coursing through their vanes [sic],
through their hearts, and through their souls. They are consumed with jealousy and rage.
They are all liberals--and make no mistake: That's what this is about…These people are
scum.”
- Rush Limbaugh, after being rejected in his bid to own the St.
Louis Rams199
In doing this study I had two main goals. One was to show how the NFL—
through its NFL Films-produced filmography as well as in its broadcast material and
stadium campaigns, works as a propaganda engine for values associated with the
countersubversive tradition—namely fascination with violence and valuation of
hierarchical order. In the former case, the NFL acts as sort of proxy battleground in times
of military mobilization where the public can partake in the military spectacle without
having to actually bear witness to combat. Moreover, NFL films normalize violence as an
inevitable trait of everyday existence, reinforcing a Hobbesian view of human nature that
cries out for a National Security State to be erected and celebrated for its ability to protect
the country from boundary invasion by demons.
In the case of valuation of hierarchical order, I showed how NFL films normalize
the corporate, paternal organization by connecting the corporate form and the actors
within it to earlier notions in American pop culture about surveillance-oriented pastoral
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heroism (embodied in owners, executives, and coaches) and the taming of the wilderness
and its savages (embodied by the players). Lastly, I showed how the NFL uses other
strategies along with countersubversion to promote policy goals, such as evoking
invidious comparison in communities in order to extract public subsidies for their private
stadiums. By preying on community self-esteem, the NFL and corporate growth
coalitions exploit the lived identities of people within an urban area by connecting them
to the team’s private profits. In noting this, I demonstrated how the NFL has genuine
political-economic incentive to propagandize the countersubversive agenda. Whether its
stadium deals, anti-trust protections, or lucrative partnerships with the Department of
Defense, the promulgation of the countersubversive agenda leads to a climate that
produces lucrative profit opportunities for the NFL as well as the maintenance of a
political atmosphere in which the prerogatives and privileges of those who own the
League will be seldom challenged as they are taken for granted as business as usual. At
the same time, this promulgation of countersubversion is not as hegemonic as the NFL
would like—as stadium defeats and labor strife indicate.
It is this latter point that speaks to the second goal of this study, namely to bring
to the fore how elements of popular culture like the NFL and their relationship to the
countersubversive value system help constitute a significant part of the American
political tradition and why it is important for political science to acknowledge this
relationship. As I noted in my introduction, the scholarship surrounding the American
political tradition has offered numerous explanations as to what the American tradition is
(liberalism, republicanism, etc.) without explaining why the values that create a tradition
gain such traction within mass society over an extended period of time.
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If, as E.E. Schattschneider once put it, “the definition of alternatives is the
supreme instrument of power,”200 it becomes particularly important for stakeholders of
the status quo to have a tool like propaganda—particularly countersubversive
propaganda, with its emphasis on external and internal monsters, fear of boundary
invasion, and subordination to hierarchical order to rely on in order to restrict political
alternatives to the maintenance of a comparatively conservative ideology even (or
especially) in times where the status quo might otherwise be questioned.
As Rogin argues, this is particularly necessary in a purported liberal polity like the
United States where the “divided vocabulary of competition and self-interest” runs up
against the vocabulary “of community and self.” Rather than acknowledge the
contradictions between individualism and nationalism outright, countersubversive
propaganda attempts to heal the split by avoiding its sources in society by creating unity
through the split of the countersubversive and his foe.201 Rogin saw mass texts,
particularly film, as the most important propaganda vehicle for the propagation of
countersubversive values because they not only made political demonology visible in
widely popular and influential forms but because they also had a power that was normally
denied the word alone—they show us what we are talking about in our everyday
discourse. In doing so they speak to a fundamental impulse to ingest historical, physical,
and personal experience—they present the image as the reality202 and provide a reference
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point by which we can reassure ourselves of the validity of our own fears and fantasies
while being assured we are also protected from them.
This is not to deny that challenges to the status quo and contestation over
meanings do not break through into dominant countersubversive discourse at times.
Indeed, as evidenced by stadium and labor issues, the NFL itself has been a place where,
despite its rigid hierarchical system, players have at times been able to at least moderately
reframe the substance of the debate about what the game is and its meaning in American
life. The first significant case of this was former St. Louis Cardinals lineman Dave
Meggyesy’s startling departure from the game at the top of his career to write the exposé
Out of Their League, which showed the rampant racism behind the early days of the
game that reads as if it’s part of the countersubversive tradition scholarship itself.
Black ball players are selected even more stringently on the basis of “correct
attitudes than whites. Blacks are in an especially difficult position; if they act like
Toms, they will be completely dominated by the white ball players and lose
respect for themselves and each other. But if they are too “militant” and try to
assert their basic manhood by attempting to break out of the whites’ stereotype of
the dumb, insensitive jock, they are immediately under suspicion and often cut
from the squad,203

Meggyesy’s recount of the racism and paranoia of “militancy” can easily be seen
as the countersubversive fear of internal subversion of foreign elements into an
established culture and ideology. When released, the book shed a public light on the dark
underbelly of the League and contributed to a (slight) reimagining of race relations in the
pro football. Moreover, the early battle for a genuine union during Meggyesy and
Oriard’s time eventually led to the legal cases that granted players a significant place at
the NFL’s economic table. More recent examples include Steelers’ linebacker James’
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Harrison’s declining to visit President Obama at the White House,204 perhaps indicating
an indifference to the sovereign in juxtaposition to official NFL filmography.
Of all the most current examples none is perhaps more exemplary of direct
contestation against countersubversive propagandizing itself than the League’s rejection
of a potential bid by Rush Limbaugh to be a minority partner in a potential sale of the St.
Louis Rams. When Limbaugh who,as previously mentioned was once fired as an NFL
analyst on ESPN for racist remarks about Donovan McNabb, was announced as part of a
bidding group for minority ownership in the Rams, black player outrage was pointedly
critical. New York Giant Mathias Kiwanuka told the New York Daily News, "I don't
want anything to do with a team that he has any part of. He can do whatever he wants; it
is a free country. But if it goes through, I can tell you where I am not going to play.” New
York Jets linebacker Bart Scott said, "I can only imagine how his players would feel....
He could offer me whatever he wanted; I wouldn't play for him."205 Such outright refusal
to potentially play under one of America’s premier demonologists (a man who once
claimed that watching the NFL was like watching “a game between the Bloods and the
Crips without any weapons”)206 undoubtedly put pressure on otherwise conservative
owners to publicly denounce a Limbaugh ownership bid, with even Commissioner Roger
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Goodell saying Limbaugh’s history of “divisive” comments would not be tolerated in the
League proper.207
These examples suggest, albeit anecdotally, that pre-existing ideologies, built up
from lived experience (like the life of a black player in a conservative sport) provide the
ground for contestation of countersubversive propaganda by providing alternative
reference points to its meanings. Still, such challenges run up against the overwhelming
resources, conservative political connections,208 and near-monopoly on the NFL ‘brand’
the League has on its presentation in image mediums like television and film. And
despite an uncertain labor situation in 2011 and a poor economy, the NFL continues to
see success in television ratings and revenues—both are up over 10 percent from last
year,209 meaning they still have the overwhelming economic edge in terms of getting their
propaganda out to the mass public.
What this study demonstrates is not only how the countersubversive tradition is
presented today in a particular form of popular culture but also how it influences the
definition of political alternatives that constitutes American politics. As John Fiske once
said, television cannot create reality, but it can reinforce the dominant sense of reality.210
It’s time to acknowledge this and perhaps trade in the hue of the Hartzian amber of liberal
tradition scholarship for the glow of the Sunday afternoon television broadcast.

207

“Limbaugh Already Down One Vote,” Associated Press, October 13, 2009. Of particular note in the
story is that Indianapolis Colts owner Jim Irsay, one of the more socially progressive owners (and one of a
handful of owners employing a black head coach) was the first owner to speak out against Limbaugh.
208

Zirin, “Why NFL Owners…” As Zirin notes, in the last 30 years, 23 of the League’s 32 owners donated
more to Republicans than Democrats by large margins.
209

Gasper, “Knocking Heads”

210

John Fiske, Television Culture: Popular Pleasures and Politics, (UK: Routledge, 1988) 21.

112

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Austin, John. “Dallas Passed and the Cowboys Ran” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Nov. 7,
2004.
Autumn Ritual, specially-produced DVD, directed by Phil Tuckett (1986; New York:
NFL Films 2008).
Boggs, Carl. “Pearl Harbor: How Film Conquers History,” New Political Science, 28 no.
4 (December 2006): 451-456.
Borges, Ron. “Tom Brady adds star Power to Off-Field Negotiations,” Boston Herald,
December 4, 2009.
Burton Nelson, Mariah. The Stronger Women Get, the More Men Love Football: Sexism
and the American Culture of Sports, (Harcourt-Brace 1994).
Bush, George W., State of the Union Address, January 28, 2002.
Chomsky, Noam “Containing the Threat of Democracy,” (paper presented at the
Glasgow Conference on Self-Determination and Power: Life Task, Political Task,
January 1990).
Classen, Jeff. “Money, Star Power aided stadium issue,” Dallas-Fort Worth Star
Telegram, Nov 4, 2004.
deCerteau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life, (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1984).
Delaney, Kevin and Eckstein, Rick. Public Dollars, Private Stadiums: the Battle Over
Building Sports Stadiums (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2003).
DeMause, Neil and Cagan, Joanna. Field of Schemes: How the Great Stadium Swindle
turns Public Money into Private Profit (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
2008).
Elias, Robert. The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S. Foreign Policy and
Promoted the American Way Abroad, (New York: the New Press, 2010).
Edelman, Murrary. The Symbolic Uses of Politics (second edition), (Chicago: University
of Illinois Press, 1985).
——. Constructing the Political Spectacle (1988: Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press).
Fields, Barbra Jeanne. “Slavery, Race and Ideology,” in New Left Review (181, 1990).

113

Fiske, John. Television Culture: Popular Pleasures and Politics, (UK: Routledge, 1988).
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (New York: Random
House, 1977).
Gasper, Chris. “Knocking heads on CBA,” The Boston Globe, October 11, 2009.
Gitlin, Todd. “Television’s Screens: Hegemony in Transition,” in American Media and
Mass Culture: Left Perspectives, ed. Donald Lazere, 247 (University of California Press,
1987).
The Greatest Players and Coaches DVD, produced by Todd Schmidt (2006; Burbank,
CA: Warner Home Video).
Harris, Elliot. “NFLPA Executive Director’s View of the Game,” Chicago Sun-Times,
January 19, 2010.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, ed. C.B. McPherson (London: Penguin Classics 1985).
Hargreaves, John. “Sport and Hegemony: Some Theoretical Problems,” in Sport, Culture,
and the Modern State, Cantelon, H. and Gruneau, R. eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1979), 133.
Hartmann, Doug. “Rush Limbaugh, Donovan McNabb, and A Little Social Concern ,”
Journal of Sport and Social Issues 31, no.1 2007 45-60.
King, Samantha. “Offensive Lines: Sport-State Synergy in an Era of Perpetual War,”
Cultural Studies, Critical Methodologies 10, no. 10 (2008) 527-539.
Lakoff, George. Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2002).
Lipset, Seymour Martin. American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1995).
Lord, Jeffery. “Who is DeMaurice Smith?” The American Spectator Online, October 15,
2009.
Meggyesy, Dave. Out of their League, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
1970).
Messner, Michael A., Dunbar, M. and Hunt, D., “The Televised Sports Manhood
Formula, “Journal of Sport and Social Issues 24, no. 4 (2000): 388-389.
Morone, James. “Storybook Truths about America,” Studies in American Political
Development 19, Fall 2005: 216-226.

114

Mosier, Jeff. Personal correspondence August 24, 2009.
“NFL Kickoff 2008”, The National Football League (2008).
Nix, Mede. “Costas Reference to ‘Palace in Dallas irks Arlington Mayor,” Dallas News
Blog September 22, 2009.
NBC Sunday Night Football (September 27, 2009) [Television Broadcast] New York:
NBC.
Obama, Barack. Inaugural Address January 21, 2009.
O’Connor, Rory “Why Does America leave it to NFL Owners to tell Rush Limbaugh
where to go?” published on Alternet.org, October 15, 2009.
Oriard, Michael. Brand NFL: Making and Selling America’s Favorite Sport, (Chapel
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
Parenti, Michael. Make Believe Media: The Politics of Entertainment, (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1992).
Patriots: Superbowl XXXVI Champions, directed by Dave Petreilius (New York, NY:
NFL Films/USA Home Entertainment, 2002).
Reiss, Mike. “Family Ties: Rooneys, Steelers are United” Boston Globe January 29,
2009.
Rogin, Michael. Ronald Reagan: the Movie and other Episodes in Political Demonology,
(University of California Press, 1987).
Rose, Charlie. “NFL Films Inc: Father-Son Team establishes Gold Standard for Sports
Photography,” CBS News Online, August 25, 2004.
Rousseau, J.J. Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D’Alermbert on the Theatre, trans. Alan
Bloom (Cornell University Press, 1960).
Sage, George H. Power and Ideology in American Sport: A Critical Perspective
(Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics 1998).
Schechner, Richard. Performance Studies: an Introduction (second edition), (New York:
Routledge, 2006).
Schattschneider, E.E. The Semisovereign People: A Realists’ View of Democracy in
America, (Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich College Publishing, 1975).

115

Smith, Rogers “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: Multiple Traditions in America,”
The American Political Science Review 87, no.3 (Fall 2003): 549-566.
——. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Views of Citizenship in the Liberal State (Yale University
Press, 1997).
Super Bowl XXV” in Super Bowl XXI-XXX Collector’s Set. Executive Producer: Steve
Sabol (New York: NFL Films, 2004).
“Super Bowl XXXVI” in Super Bowl XXXI-XL Collector’s Set. Executive Producer Steve
Sabol (New York: NFL Films, 2004).
Super Bowl XLIII Gameday (February 1, 2009). [Television Broadcast] New York: NBC.
“Super Bowl XLIV dethrones M*A*S*H*, sets all-time record” The Hollywood
Reporter, February 8, 2010.
Taylor, Larry. “Our Heritage in Decline” The Dallas Morning News, August 8, 2004.
“This is the NFL 2008-2009.” National Football League (2008).
“Touchdown Arlington!” Mailer 1.
——. Mailer 2.
Trujillo, Nick. “Machines, Missiles, and Men: Images of the Male Body on ABC’s
Monday Night Football” Sociology of Sport Journal, 12 (1995): 403-423.
“Underwriting Cowboys,” The Dallas Morning News, March 10, 2003.
Veblen, Thornstein. The Theory of the Leisure Class, unabridged (New York: Dover
Publications, 1994).
Where the Money Came From” Fort Worth Star Telegram, June 5, 2009.
The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.
Yost, Mark. Tailgating, Sacks, and Salary Caps: How the NFL Became the Most
Successful Sports League in History (Chicago: Kaplan Publishing, 2006).
Zirin, David. “Why NFL Owners Must Flush Rush,” Edge of Sports.com blog, October
12, 2009.
——. Response to Rush Limbaugh’s Rage,” Edge of Sports.com Blog, October 15, 2009.

116

